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INTRODUCTION
The country’s collective patience for coddling private institutions of higher education is waning. At the local level, there is an
effort afoot to challenge the tax-exempt status of Princeton University.1 At the state level, legislators in Massachusetts and Connecticut
have suggested imposing taxes that would target Harvard University
and Yale University.2 At the federal level, a number of proposals

*

Professor, Vanderbilt University Law School.
See Elise Young, Princeton’s Neighbors Say to Heck With Freebies—We
Want Cash, BLOOMBERG (May 2, 2016, 5:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2016-05-02/princeton-s-neighbors-say-to-heck-with-freebies-wewant-cash (noting a challenge to the tax-exempt status of Princeton University,
and also noting rhetoric from mayors in Boston, Chicago, and New Orleans aimed
at collecting revenue from local private universities).
2
See, e.g., Peter Schworm & Matt Viser, Lawmakers Target $1B Endowments, BOSTON.COM (May 8, 2008), http://archive.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2008/05/08/lawmakers_target_1b_endowments/ (reporting on
consideration by the Massachusetts legislature of a plan to impose a 2.5% tax on
1
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have been floated that would impact the tax treatment of universities
and their endowments, including imposing an excise tax on endowment income.3
In this paper, I will add my voice to the chorus of those who
endowments in excess of $1 billion, which would have affected not merely Harvard University, but also Amherst College, Boston College, Boston University,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Smith College, Tufts University, Wellesley College, and Williams College); Michelle Liu, State Aims to Tax University
Endowment, YALE DAILY NEWS (March 23, 2016), http://yaledailynews.com/blog/2016/03/23/state-aims-to-tax-university-endowment/ (reporting on
two bills introduced in Connecticut: S.B. 413, which would tax private university
endowments worth over $10 billion, and S.B. 414, which would increase the
amount of private university property subject to local property tax).
3
Although no legislation resulted, in 2008, the Senate Finance Committee
considered imposing a 5% annual spending requirement on university endowments. See Alex Bloom, Iowa Senator Defends Inquiry, 5 Percent Spending Minimum, CBS NEWS (March 12, 2008), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/iowa-senator-defends-inquiry-5-percent-spending-minimum/. Per Senator Chuck Grassley
(R-Iowa), the reason for the proposal was that “Tuition has gone up, college presidents’ salaries have gone up, and endowments continue to go up and up . . . .It’s
fair to ask whether a college kid should have to wash dishes in the dining hall to
pay his tuition when his college has a billion dollars in the bank.” See Baucus,
Grassley Write to 136 Colleges, Seek Details of Endowment Pay-Outs, Student
Aid, U.S. S. COMM. FIN. (Jan. 24, 2008), http://www.finance.senate.gov/release/baucus-grassley-write-to-136-colleges-seek-details-of-endowment-payouts-student-aid (internal quotation marks omitted).
Then, in 2014, House Representative Dave Camp (R-Michigan) included as part
of his comprehensive tax overhaul plan the imposition of a 1% excise tax on the
net investment income of schools with endowment assets of at least $100,000 per
full-time student. See, e.g., Janet Lorin & Lauren Streib, House Panel Questions
College Endowment Spending, Tax Benefits, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 7, 2015, 6:32 PM)
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-07/house-panel-questionscollege-endowment-spending-tax-benefits; Christine Y. Cahill & Amna H.
Hashmi, Tax Reform Could Cost Harvard Millions, Though Passage Unlikely,
THE HARV. CRIMSON (Apr. 3, 2014), http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2014/
4/3/tax-reform-cost-endowment/.
Most recently, in 2016, House Representative Tom Reed (R-New York) resurrected Senator Grassley’s 2008 efforts by proposing that university endowments
worth over $1 billion devote 25% of their annual endowment income to financial
aid or risk losing the university’s tax-exempt status. See Janet Lorin, Richest U.S.
Schools Could Lose Tax Status in Endowment Proposal, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 8,
2016, 5:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-01-08/richestu-s-schools-could-lose-tax-status-in-endowment-proposal. This proposal would
currently affect 92 institutions. See id. Given the state of gridlock in Washington,
D.C., chances of enactment are currently at best remote.
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would change the rules of federal taxation as applied to institutions
of higher education. But rather than focus on the taxation of such
institutions directly, I will instead focus on the propriety of granting
such institutions the ability to receive gifts that are tax-deductible by
the donor. I argue that in the specific and limited context of gifts
made to university endowments, an adequate defense for providing
the tax preference of a charitable contribution deduction is lacking.
I. TAX EXEMPTIONS FOR EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
In a world in which most activities are not taxed, the power to
tax is surely “the power to destroy.”4 Conversely, in a world in
which most activities are taxed, the willingness to forego full taxation, whether by granting a tax deduction to persons funding an activity,5 by granting a tax exemption to the actual conduct of the activity,6 or perhaps by granting both,7 is an exercise of the power to
establish any activity that is not fully taxed.8 The reason is that when
the federal government grants an activity the privilege to receive
tax-advantaged funding (e.g., by way of allowing it to receive taxdeductible charitable contributions)9 and/or grants to those persons
who conduct the activity the privilege to conduct their activity in a

4

McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 431 (1819).
See, e.g., I.R.C. § 170(a)(1) (West 2014) (codified as 26 U.S.C.
§ 170(a)(1)) (allowing federal income tax deductions to taxpayers who contribute
to charitable organizations).
6
See, e.g., I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (West 2014) (codified as 26 U.S.C.
§ 501(c)(3)) (exempting charitable and religious organizations from federal income tax).
7
Taken together, I.R.C. §§ 170(a)(1) and 501(c)(3) provide both tax-deductible contributions and tax-exempt “income” for certain non-profit organizations.
See supra notes 5–6.
8
See Erika King, Tax Exemptions and the Establishment Clause, 49
SYRACUSE L. REV. 971, 994 (1999) (“[G]ranting a taxpayer an exemption from a
tax that would otherwise accrue (i.e., from the ‘normative tax’) is the same—in
purpose and in effect—as collecting that tax and giving the taxpayer a direct subsidy.”) (internal parentheses in original). But cf. Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y.,
397 U.S. 664, 672 (1969) (“The legislative purpose of a property tax exemption
is neither the advancement nor the inhibition of religion; it is neither sponsorship
nor hostility.”).
9
See I.R.C. § 170(a)(1) (codified as 26 U.S.C. § 170(a)(1)).
5
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tax-exempt manner,10 it cedes to such activity a part of what would
otherwise be its general revenue.11
As is the case with any “tax expenditure,” the federal government could have used the revenue lost to the establishment of the
favored activity to provide additional benefits to society.12 Or if sufficient benefits were already being provided, the federal government
could have defrayed a part of the cost of such benefits and thus ultimately lowered the tax burdens imposed on persons conducting less
favored activities.13 Phrased somewhat more provocatively, we all
pay for these favored activities—because of them, we either receive
fewer government benefits or pay higher taxes than we otherwise
would.14 Given this reality, the federal government ought to bear a
10

See I.R.C. § 501(a) (codified as 26 U.S.C. § 501(a)).
See, e.g., Victor Thuronyi, Tax Expenditures: A Reassessment, 1988 DUKE
L.J. 1155, 1158 (1988) (“[A] preferential tax provision operates in two steps: first
the taxpayer pays the government the [tax] called for . . . in the absence of the
preferential provision, and then the government gives the taxpayer a government
grant or subsidy . . . .[T]he government makes the subsidy payment by reducing
the taxpayer’s tax liability.”). See also STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R.
MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES 3 (1985) (“Put differently, whenever government decides to grant monetary assistance to an activity or group, it may choose
from a wide range of methods, such as . . . [reducing] the tax liability otherwise
applicable by adopting a special exclusion, deduction, or the like for the favored
activity or group.”).
12
See Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV.
L. REV. 705, 713 (1970) (“We can assume it is understood that each incentive
must serve purposes which the nation wants to achieve and is willing to finance,
rather than let the marketplace determine the extent to which the result will obtain.”).
13
Confirmation of this possibility can be found in the fact that the Office of
Management and Budget annually publishes a “tax expenditure” budget to accompany the publication of the Budget of the U.S. Government. See generally,
e.g., OFF. MGMT. & BUDGET, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, BUDGET OF THE U.S.
GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2016 219–64 (2015). See also NORTON FRANCIS ET
AL., TAX POL’Y CTR., What are tax expenditures and how are they structured?, in
THE TAX POLICY BRIEFING BOOK: A CITIZENS’ GUIDE TO THE TAX SYSTEM AND
TAX POLICY available at http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/background/expenditures/budget.cfm (last visited Mar. 11, 2017).
14
See, e.g., David I. Walker, Suitable for Framing: Business Deductions in a
Net Income Tax System, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1247, 1254 (2011) (“[T]he
difference between tax subsidies and direct spending is illusory. The government
can influence the allocation and distribution of societal resources through either
avenue, but the use of a tax subsidy instead of direct spending creates an illusion
11
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heavy burden to justify granting the privileges of tax-deductible
funding and/or tax-exempt operations to any activity.15
The only truly satisfactory justification for granting these privileges to any particular activity is that such grant does not in fact
impose a burden on the remainder of society.16 That prerequisite is
most easily and obviously satisfied if the federal government would,
in the absence of such a grant, itself provide the service that the taxfavored activity provides, though presumably not as efficiently.17 At
least in the case of the grant of tax preferences to private universities, this sounds like a plausible justification.18 In many, even most,

of smaller government from a fiscal perspective because the tax subsidy appears
to reduce taxes and spending. Although an illusion, the appearance affects reception and helps to explain the popularity of various tax programs.”).
15
Cf. Harding Hosp., Inc. v. United States, 505 F.2d 1068, 1071 (6th Cir.
1974) (“An exemption is an exception to the norm of taxation. An organization
which seeks to obtain tax exempt status, therefore, bears a heavy burden to prove
that it satisfies all the requirements of the exemption statute.”).
16
But see, e.g., Daniel S. Goldberg, Tax Subsidies: One-Time Vs. Periodic:
An Economic Analysis of the Tax Policy Alternatives, 49 TAX L. REV. 305, 308
n.16 (1994) (“[T]ax incentives create[] undue tax complexity . . . . [Also,] . . .
those taxpayers who [are] in the highest tax bracket receive[] the greatest tax reduction from the more common tax incentive provisions that operate[] through
exemptions or deductions . . . .”).
17
See Rob Atkinson, Altruism in Nonprofit Organizations, 31 B.C.L. REV.
501, 577 (1990) (“Accordingly, the result of their collective decision-making will
be to provide public goods at the level of quality and quantity that satisfies the
demands of the median voter. Voters who prefer different levels, whether higher
or lower, will thus be left dissatisfied with governmental provision of public
goods.”).
18
See, e.g., Henry Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations from Corporate Income Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54, 66 (1981) (“A . . .
common view of the exemption is [as] a means of subsidizing particular services—such as health care, education, research, and aid to the poor—that nonprofit organizations often provide . . . that otherwise would have to be provided
by the government . . . .”). See also Henry Hansmann, Professor of L., Yale Law
Sch., Why Are Colleges and Universities Exempt from Taxes?, Essay Prepared for
the National Center for Philanthropy and the Law’s 25th Annual Conference:
“Colleges and Universities: Legal Issues in the Halls of Ivy” 4–11 (Oct. 24–25,
2013) (transcript available in the New York University School of Law Library)
(discussing other rationales for subsidizing higher education and briefly mentioning the United States’s experimentation with for-profit higher education).
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developed countries, the public sector is the almost exclusive provider of higher education.19 We too could follow those countries’
collective lead and have the federal government impose additional
taxes to fund the provision of higher education.20 Indeed, we do follow this lead to a significant extent, albeit mostly indirectly: the federal government provides students with financial assistance, universities with research grants and other revenue streams, and states with
funding that helps them to establish and maintain public universities.21
Why do we tolerate the alternative of private universities financed largely by tax preferences? Why do we allow taxpayers to
divert what would otherwise be public funds to what is essentially
the private sector, so long as that sector uses such funds to provide
what are essentially public services? Before examining the reasons
that have been identified to justify this use of tax preferences to encourage the growth of a “private” industry to satisfy a public goal, I
want to remind the reader why we in the United States favor such
hybrid structures for organizing industries: we prefer limited government,22 we believe that the private sector can do almost anything

19

See, e.g., Andrew Kelly, America’s High-Risk, High-Reward Higher Education System, FORBES (Mar. 1, 2015, 12:25 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
akelly/2015/03/01/americas-high-risk-high-reward-higher-education-system/2/
(“Higher education [in countries other than the United States] is free or extremely
low-cost, but access to academic degree programs at top universities is heavily
rationed.”).
20
See id.
21
Financial assistance to students may or may not be based on need. See, e.g.,
20 U.S.C. § 1070a(a)(1) (West 2014) (providing Pell grants to eligible students).
Federal education funding to states encourages states to provide higher education
services through state-established public universities. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 49-9-102(b)(1)–(2) (West 2014) (accepting federal funding for higher education). The federal government also provides higher education services directly to
a very limited extent at West Point and other military academies. See, e.g., 10
U.S.C. § 2161 (West 2014) (describing schools run by the Department of Defense).
22
See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Jones, Americans Remain Divided on Preference for
Gov’t Activity, GALLUP (Sept. 29, 2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/177422/
americans-remain-divided-preference-gov-activity.aspx (“54% of Americans say
the government is ‘trying to do too many things that should be left to individuals
and businesses.’”).
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better than the public sector,23 and we treat the competitive market
as a holy grail.24 All else being equal, we believe that private universities will necessarily provide “better” educational services than
public universities.25

23
See, e.g., Chris Edwards, Government Infrastructure Is Inefficient Everywhere, CATO INST.: CATO AT LIBERTY (Mar. 19, 2014, 5:23 PM),
http://www.cato.org/blog/government-infrastructure-inefficient-everywhere (using government dam projects as an egregious example of government cost overruns); Millennials Think Government is Inefficient, Abuses its Power, and Supports Cronyism, REASON.COM (July 10, 2014, 8:02 AM), http://reason.com/
poll/2014/07/10/reason-rupe-2014-millennial-survey (arguing that millennials
see the government as inefficient and wasteful though they support government
action in several specific areas). But see BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF
LAB., USDL-16-2255, EMPLOYER COSTS FOR EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION—
SEPTEMBER 2016 1 (Dec. 8, 2016), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/ecec.pdf (showing that the hourly cost to employers for compensating
government workers was merely $13.66 more than workers in the private sector);
Joseph Slater & Elijah Welenc, Are Public-Sector Employees “Overpaid” Relative to Private-Sector Employees? An Overview of the Studies, 52 WASHBURN L.J.
533, 541–42 (2013) (noting that studies agree that higher-level public employees
are paid less than their private-sector counterparts, whereas as lower-level public
employees tend to be paid a little more).
24
Compare Jonathan Haidt, Capitalism As Our Greatest Hope, THE WORLD
POST (Aug. 16, 2013, 9:58 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jonathanhaidt/capitalism-as-our-greates_b_3600792.html (“I think in the long run our
greatest hope is capitalism . . . . What I’m hoping is that we as Americans, and
people in other countries, too, can think more clearly about capitalism as the engine of growth that lifts people out of poverty.”), with Robert Reich, The Myth of
the ‘Free Market’ and How to Make the Economy Work for Us, THE HUFFINGTON
POST (Sept. 16, 2013, 12:06 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-reich/
free-market_b_3935173.html (“One of the most deceptive ideas continuously
sounded by the Right (and its fathomless think tanks and media outlets) is that the
‘free market’ is natural and inevitable, existing outside and beyond government.”)
(internal parentheses in original).
25
See, e.g., Joni Hersch, Catching Up Is Hard To Do: Undergraduate Prestige, Elite Graduate Programs, and the Earnings Premium 3 (Vanderbilt Univ.
Law Sch. Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 14-23), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2473238 (finding that data demonstrates an earnings
premium for male students who graduate from elite undergraduate institutions).
But see Deborah L. Jacobs, Public or Private College. Is The Outcome Any Different?, FORBES (Oct. 2, 2013, 8:58 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/deborahl
jacobs/2013/10/02/public-or-private-college-is-the-outcome-any-different/ (arguing that, given the rising costs of higher education, private education is not
worth the additional money spent).
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Yet, the mere coexistence of public and private universities belies the proposition that private universities provide better educational services than public universities in any meaningful sense. For
example, if private universities provided the same quality of education, but did so more cheaply, one would expect public universities
to be driven out of the market. Similarly, if they offered a higher
quality of education, but at the same price, one would again expect
public universities to be driven out of the market. So, assuming the
market works,26 private universities must provide a different quality
of education at a different price, with some consumers preferring
one quality-price combination and others preferring the other. Of
course, even if taxpayers understood that choice was the only thing
that the grant of tax preferences to private universities was buying,
support for such preferences would not necessarily evaporate.27
Americans love choice.28 And in light of recent experiences, we
could be forgiven for deeming the availability of merely for-profit

26

The market may not work for education considering the massive amount
of direct and indirect government intervention. See George Leef, The Growing
Potential of Free Market Education, FORBES (Feb. 7, 2012, 10:41 AM), http://
www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2012/02/07/the-growing-potential-of-free-market
-education/; Valerie Strauss, Why the ‘Market Theory’ of Education Reform
Doesn’t Work, WASH. POST (Oct. 12, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.
com/blogs/answer-sheet/wp/2012/10/12/why-the-market-theory-of-education-reform-doesnt-work/ (arguing that when parents are given an educational “free market,” they actually do not prioritize educational quality when choosing a particular
school for their children).
27
Cf. Arianna Prothero, Charters & Choice News Roundup: Unions vs.
School Choice, EDUC. WEEK BLOGS: CHARTERS & CHOICE (Mar. 6, 2015, 10:29
AM), http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/charterschoice/2015/03/charters_choice_
news_roundup_unions_vs_school_choice.html?print=1 (describing recent experimentation with charter schools and school voucher programs at the state and local
levels).
28
See, e.g., Art Markman, The Dark Side of Choice in America, THE
HUFFINGTON POST: BLOG (Aug. 4, 2011, 10:31 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost
.com/art-markman-phd/dark-side-of-choice_b_888751.html (“A big part of our
identity is the freedom of choice. The strong libertarian streak that runs through
American politics reflects a don’t-tread-on-me spirit that has been part of our national identity since Revolutionary War times.”).
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alternatives such as DeVry University or ITT Educational Services
to represent insufficient choice.29
II. THE THEORETICAL DEFENSE OF THE CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTION
DEDUCTION
Legal commentators have proposed three rationales to justify the
use of tax preferences to achieve public goals and, in particular, to
justify the grant to certain institutions of the privilege to receive
funding by way of tax-deductible contributions.30 One could apply
each of these rationales to the goal of providing higher education (or
to the lesser goal of multiplying choices in higher education).31
First, such tax deductions encourage generosity and thus maximize the total amount of societal resources devoted to the pursuit

29

See DeVry University Historical Timeline, DEVRY UNIV., http://www.
devry.edu/community-network/our-heritage.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2017) (describing how DeVry University is a for-profit university that features online and
on-campus classes); Patricia Cohen, ITT Educational Services Closes Campuses,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/07/business/itt-educational-services-closes-its-campuses.html (reporting on the shuttering of ITT
Educational Services in the wake of poor educational performance). See also Alia
Wong, The Downfall of For-Profit Colleges, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 23, 2015, 1:30
PM),
http://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2015/02/the-downfall-offor-profit-colleges/385810/ (explaining how for-profit colleges and universities
have come under intense federal scrutiny because of their poor performance).
30
See, e.g., David M. Schizer, Subsidizing Charitable Contributions: Incentives, Information, and the Private Pursuit of Public Goals, 62 TAX L. REV. 221,
224 (2009) (proposing “three justifications for the [tax] deduction, each responding to a different information or incentive problem that is inherent in the pursuit
of public goals”). Throughout this essay, I will treat the privilege of receiving taxdeductible contributions as though it is necessarily coupled with the privilege of
operating in a tax-exempt manner. In principle, such coupling is not necessary.
After all, one could create a tax scheme in which contributions to private universities were not deductible but in which the operation of such universities were
exempt from taxes. Likewise, one could conceive of the converse. Since such intermediate schemes have not been employed in our tax system, however, I will
not dwell on them here. See supra notes 2–3 (reflecting various proposed plans
by state and federal legislatures).
31
Cf. Mark J. Cowan, Taxing and Regulating College and University Endowment Income: The Literature’s Perspective, 34 J.C. & U.L. 507, 534–37 (2008)
(discussing tax subsidy rationales for the tax exemption of higher education).
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of public goals.32 To illustrate this point, consider a pool of $100
million of income that is federally taxable at a flat 30% marginal
rate. This pool could conceivably consist of the last $100 earned by
one million different people or the last $100 million earned by a single billionaire; at this stage of the analysis, it makes no difference.33
In the absence of contributions to private universities and any attendant tax deductions, this pool generates $30 million of tax revenue for the pursuit of public goals.34 If, however, contributions to
private universities are tax-deductible, and if this deductibility encourages taxpayers to contribute 10% of the income pool to such
universities, $37 million will be generated for the pursuit of public
goals.35 True, the federal government loses control over how $3 million is spent, but presumably the additional $7 million spent in aggregate more than compensates for this loss of control. See Table
1.1.
Table 1.1
Potential Cash
Contribution
General Spending
Controlled by
Federal
Government
Education
Spending
Controlled by
Donors

32

No Deduction for
Contributions
used to Fund
Education

Deduction for
Contributions
used to Fund
Education

$30 million

$27 million

$0

$10 million

See generally Schizer, supra note 30, at 229 (explaining that tax incentives
promote charitable giving in part because free riding encourages people to shift
the cost of charities’ public benefits to others).
33
See id. But see infra Part III (discussing how the fact that large gifts to
endowments are made by very wealthy individuals impacts whether the additional
generosity rationale for tax-deductible higher education contributions makes
sense).
34
That is, it generates 30% of $100 million.
35
In addition to the $10 million contribution, $27 million in taxes, or 30% of
$90 million, will continue to be collected.
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The arithmetic is more complicated if the income at issue is unrealized capital gain that the taxpayers intend to realize.36 Suppose
that such income is taxed at a uniform marginal rate of 15%. In that
case, in the absence of any tax-deductible contribution, the federal
government receives $15 million of tax revenue.37 However, due to
the perverse operation of the tax code, if $10 million of the property
is contributed to a private university, the federal government does
not merely lose $1.5 million of tax revenue, but rather $4.5 million,
since the amount of deemed realized capital gain declines to $90
million while the full $10 million is allowed as an ordinary income
deduction.38 Thus, as was the case with a cash gift, the amount generated for the pursuit of public goals increases (now from $15 million to $20.5 million), even as the amount controlled by the federal
government declines (now from $15 million to $10.5 million). See
Table 1.2.
No Deduction for
Deduction for
Table 1.2
Contributions
Contributions
Potential Property
used to Fund
used to Fund
Contribution
Education
Education
General Spending
$15 million
$10.5 million
Controlled by Federal
Government
Education Spending
$0
$10 million
Controlled by Donors
36

See generally I.R.C. § 1222 (2012) (codified as 26 U.S.C. § 1222); I.R.C.
§ 1(h) (West 2014) (codified as 26 U.S.C. § 1(h)).
37
That is, it generates 15% of $100 million.
38
See I.R.C. § 170(a)(1) (codified as 26 U.S.C. § 170(a)(1)); 26 C.F.R.
§ 1.170A–1(a) (2015) (allowing an above-the-line deduction for “any charitable
contribution”); 26 C.F.R. § 1.170A–1(c) (stating the amount of a contribution of
property is the fair market value of the contributed property). Thus, if a 15% tax
rate is applied to $90 million and a 30% tax rate is applied to a lost $10 million,
$10.5 million of net tax revenue results. Note that the favorable rules have some
limitations. See I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(C)(i)–(ii) (codified as 26 U.S.C.
§ 170(b)(1)(C)(i)–(ii)) (limiting contribution amounts for capital gain contributions to at least no more than 30% of the taxpayers adjusted gross income for any
given year, with any excess available as a carryover for the next five years); I.R.C.
§ 170(e) (codified as 26 U.S.C. § 170(e)) (reducing contribution amounts for capital gain contributions by their short-term capital gain).
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The second benefit alleged to follow from allowing tax-deductible contributions to private universities is that it enables the federal
government to invest its resources in a manner that more closely reflects societal preferences.39 For example, in the first illustration
above (Table 1.1), the federal government has effectively decided to
spend $3 million of what would have been its general revenue on
higher education, but has not engaged in the requisite due diligence
that would enable it to devise an efficient strategy for directing such
expenditure.40 By “piggybacking” its so-called “tax expenditure”
onto the “investment” decisions of individual donors, each of whom
it hopes is motivated to investigate the quality of the education that
his or her contribution ultimately buys, the federal government can
optimize the value of its own co-investment.41 Table 2.1 treats the
federal government’s tax revenue loss from the contribution deduction as just such a targeted piggybacked tax-expenditure investment:\
Grant of
Deduction for
Federal Revenue Contributions
Table 2.1
to State to Fund
used to Fund
Education
Education
Non-Education Spending
$27 million
$27 million
Controlled by Federal
Government
Education Spending
$3 million
$0
Controlled by Federal
Government
Education Spending
$0
$3 million42
Delegated by Federal
Government to Donors
Education Spending
$0
$7 million
Controlled by Donors
39

See generally Schizer, supra note 30, at 229–30.
See supra Table 1.1.
41
See Schizer, supra note 30, at 229 (“[S]ubsidized charity can serve as a
means for identifying and reflecting popular preferences, since the government
invests money only when individual donors do so as well.”).
42
The federal government would spend this money indirectly by allowing
taxpayers a deduction on their federal income tax for amounts they contribute to
universities.
40
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The third alleged benefit, which is the ex-post counterpart to the
second, is that private donors may be better able than the federal
government to monitor the quality of educational services they
fund.43 That is, private donors are not only likely to investigate potential donee universities before making their contributions, but are
also likely to monitor them after making their contributions.44
Before examining these purported benefits more closely, I
should modify Table 2.1 to more accurately reflect how “direct”
funding for higher education operates under our federal system. To
wit, the federal government delegates to states effectively all of the
implementation for providing such education.45 Once the decision
to delegate has been made, the federal government has essentially
two ways to proceed. First, the federal government could make an
outright grant to one or more states to fund their provision of higher
education.46 In the first column of Table 2.2 below, the federal government takes the $3 million of its general tax revenue that it has
decided to devote to higher education and gives it to one or more
states.
Second, the federal government could encourage states to exercise their own taxing powers to fund state universities by making the
43

See Schizer, supra note 30, at 230 (“[A]gents are tempted to shirk or to
behave self-interestedly, and principals may not have enough information to know
they are doing so. ‘Implementation error’ is . . . the welfare costs from poor or
costly administration. Minimizing this . . . error is a third objective in designing a
subsidy for charitable contributions.”).
44
See id. at 256 (“Since they are contributing their own money, donors have
the incentive to assess whether their gifts are having a positive impact. When the
donor is capable of making a large contribution, moreover, she is likely to have
influence with the nonprofit manager.”).
45
See 20 U.S.C. § 1001 (2012) (defining an “institution of higher education”
eligible for federal funding as an educational institution “legally authorized within
such State to provide a program of education beyond secondary education . . . .”).
See also 34 C.F.R. § 600.4 (2015) (defining an “institution of higher education”
as being “in a State” but offering only broad guidelines for federal funding eligibility).
46
See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1161y (2012) (allowing the Secretary of Education
to grant federal funding to state educational agencies to pay for their administrative expenses in participating in a Pell Grant demonstration program); 34 C.F.R.
§ 694.1 (2016) (stating the Secretary of Education will establish an annual state
grant for a state’s participation in the GEAR UP program).
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taxes imposed by states for such purpose tax deductible at the federal level.47 In theory, states could use their taxing authority to fund
any desired amount of higher education, and, in particular, could use
it to generate the same $10 million that arose in Table 2.1 from the
federal government’s tax preference granted to contributions.48 For
example, suppose the federal government wanted to pursue this approach with respect to the $100 million income pool underlying my
illustration.49 If the affected states reacted by imposing a state income tax at a 10% flat rate on that income pool, and if the federal
government allowed taxpayers to deduct their payment of that state
income tax,50 then the income pool would again generate $37 million for the pursuit of all public goals. The state governments would
control $10 million, allocated to higher education, and the federal
government would control the remaining $27 million. In this case,
shown in the second column of Table 2.2 below, the federal government’s tax expenditure would piggyback off the states’ direct expenditures, rather than off private donors’ contributions.

Table 2.2

Grant of
Federal
Revenue to
State to Fund
Education

Deduction
for State
Income Tax
used to Fund
Education

Deduction for
Contributions
used to Fund
Education

Non-Education
Spending Controlled by Federal
Government

$27 million

$27 million

$27 million

47

Cf. I.R.C. § 164 (2012) (codified as 26 U.S.C. § 164) (allowing taxpayers
who itemize their below-the-line deductions to deduct state and local property
taxes and to opt between deducting state and local sales taxes or state and local
income taxes). But no specific federal income tax deduction currently exists for
the payment of state taxes that are specifically earmarked for state educational
funding. In spite of this, states fund postsecondary education. See, e.g., COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-75-1001 (allocating funding for Colorado’s higher education institutions out of Colorado’s general revenue).
48
See supra Table 2.1.
49
See supra Part II.
50
See I.R.C. § 164 (codified as 26 U.S.C. § 164).
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$3 million51

$0

$0

$0

$3 million52

$0

$0

$7 million

$0

$0

$0

$3 million53

$0

$0

$7 million

Note that although the total amount spent on higher education is
the same in the second and the third columns of Table 2.2, the two
differ qualitatively. In the second column, where the federal government grants to the states the incentive to fund higher education by
means of federally tax deductible state income taxes, the entire $10
million ultimately devoted to higher education is extracted from the
citizenry by means of taxes rather than voluntary contributions and
is spent on education based on bureaucratic choices rather than individual choices. On the plus side, both the taxes imposed and the
bureaucratic choices made presumably significantly reflect local

51
This $3 million of federal funds is spent on higher education through a
direct grant to the states.
52
The federal government spends this money indirectly through the states by
allowing taxpayers a deduction on their federal income tax for amounts they pay
toward their state taxes specifically earmarked for higher education.
53
See supra note 42 (“The federal government would spend this money indirectly by allowing taxpayers a deduction on their federal income tax for amounts
they contribute to universities.”).
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(rather than merely national) educational preferences.54 Nevertheless, to the extent that a voluntary component of education funding
is deemed to be a virtue,55 that virtue will have been lost.
III. WHY THE THEORETICAL DEFENSE FAILS WHEN APPLIED TO
GIFTS TOWARDS ENDOWMENTS
Gifts to educational institutions tend to come in two flavors:
smaller repeat gifts that become a revenue item in such institutions’
annual budgets and larger one-time gifts that become part of such
institutions’ endowments.56 I will concede for the sake of argument
that one can justify tax preferences for the former on the grounds
proffered above.57 That is, the availability of a tax deduction for annual contributions to universities could spur giving and thus increase
the aggregate amount of funds devoted to higher education.58 Moreover, adding a private component to annual higher education funding could also lead to informational benefits, including more informed investing and improved monitoring, since annual givers
have the ability—and the incentive—to modify their giving strategies in response to changing circumstances (such as, for example, a
decline in the quality or quantity of educational services provided
54

See, e.g., Justin R. Long, Democratic Education and Local School Governance, 50 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 401, 413–39 (2014) (reviewing several arguments
in favor of local control for schools, including the notion that local control affords
choosy parents a diversity of schooling options in a real estate marketplace).
55
See Mark P. Gergen, The Case for Charitable Contributions Deduction, 74
VA. L. REV. 1393, 1409 (1988) (“Donors may prefer a system in which charities
are underfunded, and they pay a disproportionate share of the cost, because of the
pleasure (and influence) they get from a voluntary system.”) (internal parentheses
in original).
56
See, e.g., How Endowments Work, EMORY UNIV. FIN. DIV., https://www.finance.emory.edu/home/accounting_svcs/Endowment%20and%20Investment/index_accounting_how_endowments_work.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2017) (describing how a donor can give to Emory University by establishing an endowment); Planned Gifts, EMORY UNIV. FIN. DIV., https://www.finance.emory.edu/
home/accounting_svcs/Endowment%20and%20Investment/index_accounting_planned_giving.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2017) (describing common forms
of gift-giving to Emory University other than by establishing an endowment).
57
See supra Part II.
58
See Schizer, supra note 30, at 229 (“[A] familiar rationale for subsidizing
charitable contributions is to persuade donors to be more generous.”).
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by a particular educational institution).59 But one cannot similarly
justify the availability of a tax deduction for larger one-time gifts to
endowments.
To demonstrate this point, I need to make a slight modification
to the previous illustration.60 So far, I imposed no particular structure on the initial $100 million income pool. Now, I will assume that
such income pool is earned entirely by a very small number of very
wealthy individuals. This assumption comports with the reality that
gifts to endowments tend to be far fewer in number than annual gifts,
but also tend to be much larger on a per-gift basis.61 In other words,
endowments are funded primarily by the very wealthy.
A gift to an educational endowment does not produce an immediate expenditure on higher education.62 Rather, the endowment
maintains control of the funds received, invests them as it sees fit,
and annually distributes some generally fixed, relatively small percentage of its assets to its host institution.63 This arrangement is designed to maximize the likelihood that the funds last in perpetuity.64
It is only the annual distributions that actually fund higher education.65 As a preliminary matter, this arrangement might lead one to
59

See id. at 229–30, 256 (“Since [donors] are contributing their own money,
donors have the incentive to assess whether their gifts are having a positive impact.”).
60
See supra Part II.
61
See, e.g., Kaitlin Mulhere, Deep-Pocket Donors, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Jan.
28, 2015), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/01/28/2014-record-yearhigher-ed-donations (“The University of Texas at Austin . . . placed seventh
[among schools of total funds raised in 2014] thanks to a nearly $217 million art
gift that accounted for more than 40 percent of the university’s total.”). See also,
e.g., Press Release, Council for Aid to Educ., Colleges and Universities Raise
$37.45 Billion in 2014: Harvard Raises $1.16 Billion (Jan. 28, 2015),
http://cae.org/images/uploads/pdf/VSE-2014-Press-Release.pdf.
62
See, e.g., Albert Phung, How Do University Endowments Work?,
INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/06/universityendowment.asp (last visited Mar. 11, 2017) (“The sole intention of the endowment is to
invest it . . . .”).
63
See, e.g., id.
64
See, e.g., How Endowments Work, supra note 56 (“[T]he University is unable to spend the principal of the endowment but it is able to spend all or a portion
of the income that is generated through the investment of the gift.”).
65
See, e.g., Phung, supra note 62 (describing how donors can restrict how
investment income is spent and how universities have freedom to make such decisions in the absence of such restrictions).
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ask: Is it even the case that a $10 million gift to a university endowment in any relevant sense purchases $10 million in educational expenditures?
The answer is not necessarily. Importantly, any endowment requires a bureaucratic infrastructure, including investment professionals, accountants, and the like.66 Such an infrastructure does not
come cheap. For purposes of illustration, assume that the endowment’s direct costs amount to 1% of assets annually.67 On top of
these direct costs, the endowment is likely to hire outside managers,
such as hedge funds, private equity funds, and venture capital funds,
to manage a part of its assets.68 For purposes of illustration, assume
that 20% of the endowment’s assets are managed in this manner.69
66
A number of educational institutions with large endowments have established in-house “investment management companies” to manage their investments. See, e.g., HARVARD MGMT. CO., http://www.hmc.harvard.edu/investmentmanagement/index.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2017); STANFORD MGMT. CO.,
http://www.smc.stanford.edu/ (last visited Mar. 11, 2017); YALE INV. OFF.,
http://investments.yale.edu/ (last visited Mar. 11, 2017).
67
Cf. Memorandum from the Office of Fed. Relations, Harvard Univ., to The
Honorable Orrin Hatch, Chairman, Senate Comm. on Finance, United States Senate, The Honorable Kevin Brady, Chairman, House Comm. on Ways and Means,
United States House of Representatives, and The Honorable Peter Roskam, Chairman, Oversight Subcomm., House Comm. on Ways and Means, United States
House of Representatives 9 (Mar. 31, 2016) available at http://www.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/content/20160401_harvard_congressional_report.pdf
(in a letter to Congress defending the tax exempt status of Harvard University’s
endowment, Harvard University President Drew Faust stated that the annual cost
of Harvard Management Company, Inc., is around .75% of assets under management, and noted further that such cost was well below the 2% external management would generally cost).
68
Cf. JANE L. MENDILLO, HARVARD MGMT. CO., SEPTEMBER 2014 ANNUAL
ENDOWMENT REPORT, MESSAGE FROM THE CEO 6 (2014) available at
http://www.hmc.harvard.edu/docs/Final_Annual_Report_2014.pdf (in its Annual
Endowment Report for FY 2014, the Harvard Management Company, Inc. estimated that by managing its investments partially-internally (a so-called “hybrid”
structure), Harvard University had saved approximately $2.0 billion between
1994 and 2014, as compared to the cost of an entirely externally managed portfolio).
69
Cf. HEDGE CLIPPERS, ENDANGERED ENDOWMENTS: HOW HEDGE FUNDS
ARE BANKRUPTING HIGHER EDUCATION, HEDGE PAPERS NO. 25 (Feb. 7, 2016)
available at http://hedgeclippers.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/HP25.pdf (estimating that over $100 billion out of $500 billion total university endowment
funds were invested in hedge funds alone). Noted, however, that hedge funds are
not the only type of externally managed fund.
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And assume that the chosen hedge funds, private equity funds, and
venture capital funds impose a 2-and-20 fee structure on the assets
they manage, as is indeed standard industry practice: thus, 2% of
assets plus 20% of profits remain with the managers of the various
funds.70 Finally, assume that notwithstanding the heroic efforts of
the many investment professionals, the endowment’s investments
merely earn the fair expected return that reflects the risk of its investments.71 For purposes of illustration, I assume such return is
10%.
Table 3 illustrates the workings of these various fees in the year
after the endowment receives its $10 million gift, subject to the additional proviso that the endowment at the end of the year pays out
4% to its initial assets to its host university:
Table 3
Beginning of Year
Allocation
Investment Return
(10%)
Direct Costs

70

Assets Managed
Directly

Assets Managed
by Third Persons

$8,000,000

$2,000,000

$800,000

$200,000

($80,000)

See, e.g., Janet Lorin, Small Endowments Lose Money on Hedge Funds,
Trailing Big Schools, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 8, 2016, 10:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-08/small-endowments-lose-money-on-hedgefunds-trailing-big-schools (hedge funds received $2.5 billion in fees from university endowments in 2015, which amounted to over half of the total earnings from
the endowments’ investments). Cf. Victor Fleischer, Stop Universities From
Hoarding Money, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/19/opinion/stop-universities-from-hoarding-money.html (estimating that Harvard University spent $362 million and Yale University spent
$480 million in 2014 on private equity management fees).
71
See BEN JOHNSON, MORNINGSTAR’S ACTIVE/PASSIVE BAROMETER: A
NEW YARDSTICK FOR AN OLD DEBATE, MORNINGSTAR 1–2 (June 25, 2015),
available at http://corporate.morningstar.com/US/documents/ResearchPapers/
MorningstarActive-PassiveBarometerJune2015.pdf (measuring “active managers’ success relative to the actual, net-of-fee performance of passive funds, rather
than an index which isn’t investable” and finding “that actively managed funds
have generally underperformed their passive counterparts, especially over longer
time horizons, and experienced higher mortality rates . . . .”).
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(Rebalanced)
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($40,000)
($40,000)
$840,000
($400,000)
$440,000
$8,352,000

$2,088,000

The story set out in Table 3 repeats itself in subsequent years. In
the second year, the endowment’s payout to the university would
increase from $400,000 to $417,600, and in the third year it would
increase further to $435,974. The net present value of all future payouts, discounted at the 10% rate that reflects the risk of the endowment’s investments, is $7.143 million, or considerably less than the
initial $10 million contributed to the endowment.72 What has happened to the amount originally contributed for educational purposes
is that a (large) fraction has been diverted to support investment professionals and infrastructure. Presumably such diversion reflects
neither the wishes of the donors nor the objectives embodied in the

72
This result is easy to derive and generalize. Let E be the amount contributed
to the endowment ($10 million in the illustration). Let r be the expected rate of
return on the endowment’s investments that appropriately reflects the risk of such
investments (10% in the illustration). Let c be the percentage of assets paid to
various investment advisors (1% in direct costs for all endowment assets and 2and-20 paid to fund managers, for an aggregate 1.6% in the illustration). Finally,
let p be the payout rate to the university (4% in the illustration). Under these predicates, the endowment’s assets and hence the university’s payouts grow at an annual rate of (r – c – p): the former at the beginning of a hypothetical year n being
(1 + r – c – p)(n-1)*E and the latter (paid at the end of year n) consequently being
p*(1 + r – c – p)(n-1)*E. The net present value of the series of payouts, discounted
at the appropriate discount rate of r, is p*E/(c + p). Thus, in the illustration, where
p is 4% and c is effectively 1.6%, only 4/5.6 of the amount contributed to the
endowment ultimately redounds to the benefit of the university; the remaining
1.6/5.6 redounds to the benefit of the various investment professionals who directly and indirectly manage the endowment’s assets.
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charitable contribution deduction.73 Table 2.3 modifies Table 2.2 to
reflect the leakage caused by investment expenses.74

Table 2.3

Current NonEducation Spending Controlled by
Federal
Government
Current Education
Spending Controlled by Federal
Government
Current Education
Spending Delegated
by Federal
73

Grant of
Federal
Revenue to
State to
Fund
Education

Deduction
for State
Income Tax
used to
Fund
Education

Deduction for
Contributions
used to Fund
Education

$27 million

$27 million

$27 million

$3 million75

$0

$0

$0

$3 million76

$0

This last point may be a slight overstatement, inasmuch as it is not entirely
clear what all objectives are embodied in the charitable contribution deduction.
Thus, under the Internal Revenue Code, tax-favorable treatment of education includes almost anything remotely connected with education. See, e.g., John D. Colombo, Why Is Harvard Tax-Exempt? (And Other Mysteries of Tax Exemption for
Private Educational Institutions), 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 841, 857 (1993) (describing
how federal and state attempts to limit the tax exemption for educational institutions have failed). Under this standard-less standard, it is difficult to argue that
expenditures on lavish physical plant or bloated administrative staffs with even
more bloated compensation are not expenditures “on education.” But see infra
Part IV.
74
Nothing in the arithmetic set forth in note 69 hinges on any particular payout rate (or cost structure). Thus, if the payout rate doubled to 8% (as it would if
Congress adopted the recommendations of Victor Fleischer, supra note 70) and
the costs of managing endowments fell to 1% (as they might if all management
were in-house), leakage of the donor’s gift would fall to 1/(1 + 8) or 11% of the
gift. But even under those altered extremely favorable facts, fully $1.1 million or
the original $10 million gift would never produce any higher education benefits.
75
See supra note 51.
76
See supra note 52.
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$0

$7 million

$0

$0

$0

$2.143
million77

$0

$0

$5 million78

Now that I have established that a gift to a university endowment
does not in general provide an expenditure on higher education in
an amount equal to the gift’s face amount,79 let me return to the alleged benefits of funding higher education by means of tax-deductible gifts to endowments to see whether such benefits can plausibly
compensate for investment expense leakage. The short answer is
that they cannot. Indeed, one can argue that none of the alleged benefits really exist.
I can quickly dispose of the third alleged benefit: donor monitoring.80 Endowment gifts are generally one-time gifts that provide
an irrevocable stream of future revenue to a chosen institution.81
Once the gift is made, the donor has essentially no recourse even if
the chosen institution grossly mismanages either the gift or the

77

This is 30% of the $7.143 million net present value of future education
expenditures referenced in the text. See supra note 42.
78
This is 70% of the $7.143 million net present value of future education
expenditures referenced in the text.
79
The prerequisite for a gift to provide an expenditure on higher education in
an amount equal to its face amount is that the endowment is able to generate excess returns from its investment management that more than compensate for the
cost of such management. As noted in supra note 64, this holy grail is ex ante
impossible to achieve.
80
See supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text.
81
See, e.g., Phung, supra note 62.
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stream of revenue generated by the gift.82 Accordingly, a donor has
little incentive to monitor the institution after the gift has been
made.83
I can also reject the second alleged benefit, the ability to piggyback on informed societal preferences.84 The basis for this rejection
is that such piggybacking is antithetical to democratic principles.85
The federal government, through elected officials, represents all
people within its taxing jurisdiction, however imperfectly.86 Thus,
any expenditure made by the federal government presumptively reflects the will of all 321 million of us.87 And state governments, in
turn, represent all people within their taxing jurisdictions.88 Again,
82
See Schizer, supra note 30, at 263 (“Although conditions can be placed on
how the endowment is used, it will be difficult for the donor to impose a condition
relating to the quality of the effort, since the condition is hard to specify, let alone
to enforce.”).
83
See id. (“If [donors] are willing to surrender control [by giving an endowment], they must have particular confidence in the nonprofit’s management.”).
84
See supra notes 39, 41 and accompanying text.
85
See Schizer, supra note 30, at 247 (“[D]onors may not adequately represent
the preferences of society as a whole, so that there is allocation error when the
wrong projects are pursued.”). But see Az. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn,
563 U.S. 125, 142 (2011) (“Yet tax credits and governmental expenditures do not
both implicate individual taxpayers in sectarian activities . . . .When the government declines to impose a tax . . . there is no such connection between dissenting
taxpayer and alleged establishment.”).
86
Cf. Nancy C. Staudt, Taxation Without Representation, 55 TAX L. REV.
555, 571–78, 595–97 (2002) (arguing that deductions inappropriately serve as selective voting mechanisms by which taxpayers can divert otherwise public funds
for their own purposes).
87
Cf. id.
88
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No state shall make or enforce
any law which shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). Cf. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 503–04 (1999) (“A citizen
of the United States has a perfect constitutional right to go to and reside in any
State he chooses, and to claim citizenship therein, and an equality of rights with
every other citizen.” (quoting The Slaughter–House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 112–13
(1872))) (emphasis added); Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 728–29 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment)
(quoting Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 67 (1964) (Douglas, J., dissenting))
(“When racial or religious lines are drawn by the State, the multiracial, multireligious communities that our Constitution seeks to weld together as one become
separatist . . . .Since that system is at war with the democratic ideal, it should find
no footing here.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). But cf. Walz v. Tax
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any expenditure made by such governments presumptively reflects
the will of all people they represent.89 On the other hand, an endowment gift made by a single donor reflects the will of only one generally wealthy—and therefore not terribly representative—individual. If such an individual merely controlled the ultimate educational
use of his or her “excess generosity,” i.e., the incremental $4.143
million in my illustration,90 there would be little cause to object; absent the charitable contribution such amounts presumably would not
be spent on higher education at all. But such individual also controls
the ultimate educational use of the $3 million in the illustration that
the federal government intends to spend on higher education in any
event. However inefficient the federal government may be in choosing how to direct such spending, such inefficiency should be tolerated because the resulting spending will necessarily be significantly
more reflective of the public will than spending directed by any individual donor would be.91

Comm’n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 691 (1969) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“Tax exemptions, accordingly, constitute mere passive state involvement with religion
and not the affirmative involvement characteristic of outright governmental subsidy.”).
89
See, e.g., Az. Christian Sch., 563 U.S. at 142 (“A dissenter whose tax dollars are ‘extracted and spent’ knows that he has in some small measure been made
to contribute to an establishment in violation of conscience.”); id. at 148 (Kagan,
J., dissenting) (“Taxpayers who oppose state aid of religion have equal reason to
protest whether that aid flows from the one form of subsidy or the other. Either
way, the government has financed the religious activity. And so either way, taxpayers should be able to challenge the subsidy.”).
90
This “excess generosity” in my illustration is the excess of the $7.143 million spent on higher education over the $3 million that would have been spent
directly by the federal government in lieu of establishing the charitable deduction
mechanism. See supra Table 2.3.
91
See Schizer, supra note 30, at 244–48 (noting some of the problems with
using tax preferences for charities as an allocative guide). See also Rick Seltzer,
Strings Attached, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Aug. 31, 2016), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2016/08/31/wayne-state-donor-agreement-goes-under-microscope (giving an illustration of a donor’s arguable overreach in attempting to control a university’s use of an endowment gift). But see Brian Galle, The Role of
Charity in a Federal System, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 777, 790–91 (2012) (discussing Burton Weisbrod’s Median Voter Theory and its application to charitable
subsidies, stating that “[s]ubsidies for charity thus allow voters who want more of
the good to surmount the free rider barrier.”).
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But even after dismissing the latter two alleged benefits of allowing deductions for contributions to university endowments, the
first alleged benefit appears to retain its full force: in the illustration
the deduction has led to $4.143 million of completely voluntary incremental spending on higher education.92 Surely the benefits flowing from the mere availability of these additional funds should more
than compensate for the loss of the federal government’s control
over $3 million of education spending.93 Put differently, is it not beyond a doubt that the public benefit generated by $7.143 million of
public-spirited spending allocated according to the whims of a few
wealthy and generous individuals must exceed the public benefit
generated by $3 million of spending allocated according to the
whims of the federal government?
It may be beyond a doubt, but the premise is highly debatable.
Undoubtedly, some donors give until it hurts.94 But many gifts that
fund endowments are surely made by individuals who have amassed
such considerable wealth that they do not envision any alternative
lifetime or even testamentary need for the funds they donate.95 Thus,
if such donors did not make their gifts, they would instead save and
invest and generate additional investment income, which they would
also save and invest, ad infinitum. However, each year, the federal
government would take a slice of the additional income via taxation
92

See, e.g., Schizer, supra note 30, at 229. See also Table 2.3.
Or, in the alternative, the benefits from the additional funds should surely
more than compensate for the loss of the federal government’s control over $3
million of general spending.
94
See, e.g., Adam Lashinsky, Apple’s Tim Cook Leads Different, FORTUNE
(Mar. 26, 2015, 7:40 AM), http://fortune.com/2015/03/26/tim-cook/ (“To Cook,
changing the world always has been higher on Apple’s agenda than making
money. He plans to give away all his wealth, after providing for the college education of his 10-year-old nephew.”).
95
See, e.g., Douglas Belkin, Harvard Gets Largest-Ever Donation; Family
of Hong Kong-Born Investor Gives $350 Million to His Alma Mater, WALL ST. J.
(Sept. 8, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/harvard-gets-largest-ever-donation1410148865 (describing how Gerald Chan, a Harvard alum, donated $350 million
to the school); Jeff Blumenthal, Local Law School Gets Another Major Gift,
PHILA. BUS. J. (Mar. 19, 2015, 12:58 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/philadelphia/news/2015/03/19/local-law-school-gets-another-major-gift.html?page=all
(describing how John F. Scarpa, founder and former co-chairman of American
Cellular Network Corporation, gave Villanova University School of Law $5 million in donations).
93
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and direct the spending of such slice to satisfy public goals. It turns
out that, over time, the entire amount that would have been gifted
will ultimately be taxed away and thus be dedicated to the service of
public goals. While this sounds like confiscatory taxation and may
indeed be a justification for such taxation, it is in fact nothing more
than a formalization of the reality that if a taxpayer has more wealth
than he or she has any reasonable hope of ever consuming, the excess will in one way or another—whether by contribution or by taxation—ultimately be dedicated to public goals.
To illustrate this point, assume (without any loss of generality)
that the hypothetical $10 million income pool belongs to a single
wealthy donor. If the donor makes a contribution to a university endowment, the endowment receives an additional $10 million, the
federal government loses $3 million, and spending on higher education appears to increase by a net of $7 million (although as demonstrated above in fact only increases by a net of $4.143 million).96 On
the other hand, if the donor does not make a contribution, the federal
government gets $3 million of immediate tax revenue and the donor
has an incremental $7 million to save and invest. Suppose that investments earn a pre-tax expected rate of return of 10% and that such
earnings are taxed at the same 30% rate as the donor’s remaining
income.97 Then, in the first year after not making a donation, the
donor earns $700,000 more than he or she would otherwise have
earned and pays $210,000 more in federal income tax than he or she
would otherwise have paid. After the dust settles on such earnings
and taxes, the donor’s incremental investment pool increases to
$7.49 million. And this process repeats itself in the next year, and
the next, and so on.
The first important thing to note is that the federal government
now has a revenue stream that it would not have had if the donor
had made his initial contribution. Stated differently, the initial contribution did not merely deprive the federal government of $3 million of immediate tax revenue, it also deprived the federal government of $210,000 of tax revenue in the following year, and so on in
perpetuity. The second important thing to note is that the only leakage from the income pool is to the federal government in the form
of taxes. If this remains true year in and year out, as it will if the
96
97

See supra Table 2.1 and Table 2.3.
These rates are for purposes of illustration only and do not affect the result.
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donor really has no alternative need of or use for the funds, then the
net present value of revenues that eventually will be siphoned off by
the federal government will indeed be $10 million. Thus, the entire
pool will be spent by the federal government in pursuit of public
goals.98 Table 2.4 updates Table 2.3 to reflect this reality: allowing
a tax deduction for a contribution to an endowment does not result
in any additional expenditure on the pursuit of public goals.

98
This result is easy to derive and generalize; it is arithmetically the same as
the result that was derived in supra note 72. Let D be the amount otherwise contributed to the endowment ($10 million in the illustration). Let r be the expected
pre-tax rate of return on the invested assets (10% in the illustration). Let t be the
tax rate imposed on the pre-tax return (30% in the illustration), in which case (1 –
t)*r is the after-tax rate or return (7% in the illustration). Note that the initial
amount of invested assets is (1 – t)*D ($7 million in the illustration), since t*D of
tax would be collected in the absence of a contribution ($3 million in the illustration). Thus, r*(1 – t)*D of pre-tax income will be generated in the first year
($700,000 in the illustration), which in turn leads to a tax payment of t*r*(1 –
t)*D ($210,000 in the illustration). At the end of the first year, the amount of invested assets grows to (1 + (1– t)*r)*(1 – t)*D ($7.49 million in the illustration).
In the nth year, the invested assets will earn pre-tax income of r*(1 + (1– t)*r)n1
*(1 – t)*D, which will yield a tax payment of t*r*(1 + (1– t)*r)n-1*(1 – t)*D.
Moreover, at the end of the nth year, the amount of invested assets will grow to
(1 + (1– t)*r)n*(1 – t)*D. The federal government’s revenue stream is as follows:
it initially collects t*D; it then collects t*r*(1 – t)*D at the end of the first year;
and it collects t*r*(1 + (1– t)*r)n-1*(1 – t)*D at the end of the year n. When this
revenue steam is discounted at the appropriate discount rate of r, the initial tax
payment has a net present value of t*D, the year 1 tax payment has a net present
value of t*r*(1 – t)*D/(1 + r), and the year n tax payment has a net present value
of t*r*(1 + (1– t)*r)n-1*(1 – t)*D/(1 + r)n. And the sum of the net present value of
all such tax payments turns out to be D! Thus, to repeat, if no part of the otherwise
contributed and perpetually reinvested assets is ever diverted to private consumption, the federal government will eventually effectively confiscate all such assets.
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Table 2.4
(Potential Cash Contribution)
Current Non-Education
Spending Controlled by
Federal Government
Current Education Spending
Controlled by Federal
Government
NPV of Future Education and
Non-Education Spending Controlled by Federal Government
NPV of Future Education
Spending Delegated by Federal
Government to Donors
NPV of Future Education
Spending Controlled by
Donors
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Grant of
Federal
Revenue to
State to Fund
Education

Deduction for
Contributions
used to Fund
Education

$27 million

$27 million

$3 million

$0

$7 million

$0

$0

$2.143 million

$0

$5 million

To summarize, the effects of granting (versus not granting) a tax
deduction to a donor who contributes to an educational endowment
manifest themselves along three dimensions: (1) how much is actually spent in pursuit of higher education and/or in pursuit of other
public goals, (2) when such amounts are spent, and (3) who controls
how such amounts are spent. Under the assumptions illustrated in
Table 2.4, if no charitable contribution deduction exists to induce a
$10 million cash gift to an endowment, the federal government will
receive $30 million of tax revenue today, will receive an additional
$7 million (in terms of net present value) in subsequent years, and
will control the spending of all such revenue. With respect to the
future revenue, the federal government retains the flexibility to allocate such revenue to public goals, including but not limited to
higher education, as such goals evolve over time.99 On the other

99

Cf. Yair Listokin & David M. Schizer, I Like to Pay Taxes: Taxpayer Support for Government Spending and the Efficiency of the Tax System, 66 TAX L.
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hand, if a charitable contribution deduction induces a $10 million
cash gift to an educational endowment, the federal government will
receive $27 million of tax revenue today, public goals in the form of
education will receive $7.143 million (in terms of net present value)
in subsequent years, and all such $7.143 million will be spent according to a non-public administrator’s interpretation of the individual donor’s wishes.100 In this case, the $7.143 million of future
spending will be restricted to higher education at a single institution,
even if higher education funding in general ceases to be a recognized
public goal or if higher education funding of the specified institution
in particular ceases to be a desirable goal. Thus, in the context of a
cash gift to an educational endowment, it is trivial to weigh the costs
and benefits of the charitable contribution deduction: there are no
benefits! Accordingly, there is no theoretical justification for granting such tax deduction.
And as can be seen in Table 2.5, the picture only gets worse if
the donor’s contribution is made in the form of appreciated capital
gain property.101

REV. 179, 198 (2013) (“[I]n requiring particular taxes to fund only specified programs, we lose the flexibility to redirect tax dollars as conditions change. All else
being equal, the government should want this flexibility.”).
100
See, e.g., Phung, supra note 62 (providing an overview of how endowments function).
101
Recall, supra note 33 and Table 1.2, the possibility that the income from
which the deductible contribution would be made consisted entirely of unrealized
capital gain. If so, then in the absence of a contribution, the foregoing argument,
supra text accompanying notes 94-98, leads to the result that the federal government would eventually obtain tax revenue with a net present value of $10 million
from the $10 million that would have been contributed to the endowment. (This
is true even in the presence of the realization doctrine, which might lead the taxpayer to defer the realization of the gain with respect to some or all of the $10
million he would otherwise have contributed. See, e.g., DANIEL Q. POSIN &
DONALD B. TOBIN, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS
152–66 (7th ed. 2005) (briefly discussing the realization requirement for federal
income taxation); Christopher H. Hanna, Demystifying Tax Deferral, 52 SMU L.
REV. 383, 411–12 (1999) (explaining the issue of unrealized appreciation through
an example)).
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Table 2.5
(Potential Property
Contribution)
Current Non-Education
Spending Controlled by
Federal Government
Current Education Spending
Controlled by Federal
Government
NPV of Future Education and
Non-Education Spending
Controlled by Federal
Government
NPV of Future Education
Spending Delegated by Federal
Government to Donors
NPV of Future Education
Spending Controlled by Donors
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Grant of
Federal
Revenue to
State to Fund
Education

Deduction for
Contributions
used to Fund
Education

$13.5 million

$10.5 million

$1.5 million

$0

$8.5 million

$0

$0

$3.214
million102

$0

$3.929
million103

In Table 2.5, if no charitable contribution deduction exists to induce a $10 million property gift to an endowment, the federal government will receive $15 million of tax revenue today, will receive
an additional $8.5 million (in terms of net present value) in subsequent years, and will control the spending of all such revenue. With
respect to the future revenue, the federal government will retain the
flexibility to allocate such revenue to public goals, including but not
limited to higher education, as such goals evolve over time. On the
102

As the contribution costs the federal government $4.5 million of revenue,
the federal government’s share of the gift is effectively 45%. As set forth in supra
note 72, the entire $10 million gift only leads to $7.143 million net present value
of future spending on education. The $3.214 million figure in the table is 45% of
$7.143 million.
103
As the contribution costs the federal government $4.5 million of revenue,
the donor’s share of the gift is effectively 55%. As set forth in supra note 72, the
entire $10 million gift only leads to $7.143 million net present value of future
spending on education. The $3.929 million figure in the table is 55% of $7.143
million.
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other hand, if a charitable contribution deduction induces a $10 million property gift to an educational endowment, then exactly as in
the case of a cash gift (see Table 2.4), the federal government will
receive less tax revenue today ($10.5 million instead of $15 million),
while public goals in the form of education will receive $7.143 million (in terms of net present value) in subsequent years, all of which
will be spent according to a non-public administrator’s interpretation of the individual donor’s wishes. Moreover, the $7.143 million
of future spending will be restricted to higher education at a single
institution, even if higher education funding in general ceases to be
a recognized public goal or if higher education funding of the specified institution in particular ceases to be a desirable goal. Thus, as
was the case with respect to a cash gift, there is no theoretical justification for granting a tax deduction for a property gift to an educational endowment.
IV. THE EVIDENCE
Is there any evidence that would-be public funds diverted to educational endowments by the grant of tax preferences efficiently satisfy public goals? In particular, do such endowments somehow lead
to the societal purchase of more or better education? I cannot answer
that question with respect to the bare existence of endowments,104
104

Relevant literature contains one thorough attempt to divine possible reasons behind the existence of university endowments. See generally Henry Hansmann, Why Do Universities Have Endowments?, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 3 (1990).
Hansmann’s possible reasons include the following: (1) endowments are a means
to provide intergenerational equity; (2) they serve as a financial buffer during periods of adversity; (3) they insure the long-run survival of reputational capital; (4)
they protect intellectual freedom; and (5) they allow current generations to pass
on their values. See id. at 14, 19, 27, 29, 32. But Hansmann ultimately concludes
that none of these reasons explain actual university practice with respect to their
endowments. See id. at 39. See also Peter Conti-Brown, Note, Scarcity Amidst
Wealth: The Law, Finance, and Culture of Elite University Endowments in Financial Crisis, 63 STAN. L. REV. 699, 705–15 (2011) (arguing that the financial
buffer rationale is not supported by university behavior in the face of the recent
financial crisis).
Even if Hansmann had found university practice consistent with one or more of
his proffered reasons for the existence of endowments, this consistency would not
justify granting endowments tax-preferential treatment. Such treatment—which,
as I have demonstrated, supra Part III, is equivalent to diverting public funds to
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but I will attempt an answer with respect to their growth. But if an
increase in the size of endowments does not lead to more or better
education, then the actual existence of endowments cannot do so either.105
I limit my attention to the top-twenty private universities, as
ranked by U.S. News and World Report.106 I do this mostly to keep
the data set manageable, but also because these universities control
the lion’s share of endowed funds.107 I further limit my attention to
endowments—can only be justified if endowments serve public goals. Institutional survival (which is essentially what three of Hansmann’s reasons amount to)
is not a public goal. See Hansmann, supra note 104, at 19, 27, 32. And while
intergenerational equity may or may not be a public goal, it is at best a subsidiary
one that presupposes that endowment dollars are actually purchasing some more
fundamental public goal (for example, improving the quality of the education provided to members of various generations). See id. at 14. That leaves only the encouragement of intellectual freedom as a possible stand-alone public goal. See id.
at 29. But that goal is problematic as well, unless it leads to better education. First
and foremost, the tenure system—rather than the existence of educational endowments—is the primary defender of intellectual freedom, at least in a qualitative
sense—that is, with respect to what is said. See, e.g., Grimes v. E. Ill. Univ., 710
F.2d 386, 388 (7th Cir. 1983) (“The purpose of tenure is to protect academic freedom—the freedom to teach and write without fear of retribution for expressing
heterodox ideas . . . .”). See also AM. ASS’N UNIV. PROFESSORS, 1940 STATEMENT
OF PRINCIPLES ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE WITH 1970 INTERPRETIVE
COMMENTS 14 (1940), available at https://www.aaup.org/file/1940%20Statement.pdf (last visited Mar. 11, 2017). Moreover, that defending intellectual freedom in a quantitative sense—that is, with respect to how much of it is said—is
such a desirable stand-alone goal that it should be subsidized with public funds is
unclear. To wit, even the most zealous defender of the academy would be hardpressed to argue that an insufficient amount of “scholarship” is currently being
produced by America’s universities. See, e.g., Arif E. Jinha, Article 50 Million:
An Estimate of the Number of Scholarly Articles in Existence, 23 LEARNED PUB.
258, 261 (2010) (estimating the total number of scholarly articles in existence to
be almost 50 million by the end of 2008).
105
This is an arithmetic point. If increased endowment size produces no demonstrable benefit, then decreased size would not produce any demonstrable detriment, and in the limit, decreased size would result in the disappearance of endowments altogether.
106
National Universities Rankings, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., 2015, at 74.
107
See U.S. and Canadian Institutions Listed by Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 Endowment Market Value and Change in Endowment Market Value from FY2014 to
FY2015, NAT’L ASS’N OF C. & UNIV. BUS. OFFICERS, http://www.nacubo.org/
Documents/EndowmentFiles/2015_NCSE_Endowment_Market_Values.pdf
(last visited Mar. 11, 2017) [hereinafter NACUBO, FY 2015 Endowment Market
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the years between 1990 and 2015, since this period witnessed a meteoric increase in the size of endowments and since other data are
also readily available for this period.108 As shown in Table 4, during
these two-and-a-half decades, the average size of these private universities’ endowments increased 735% from $1.244 billion to
$10.378 billion, or at an annual compounded rate of 8.86%. By the
end of the period, these endowments controlled $218 billion of what
would otherwise have been the public’s money.109
Table 4110
Rank
1
2
3
4
4

School
Princeton
University
Harvard
University
Yale
University
Columbia
University
Stanford
University

1990
Endowment

2015
Endowment

$2,527,140,000

$22,723,473,000

$4,653,229,000

$36,448,817,000

$2,570,892,000

$25,572,100,000

$1,494,938,000

$9,639,065,000

$2,053,128,000

$22,222,957,000

Value]; Chris Isidore, Rich Universities Are Getting Richer, CNN MONEY (Apr.
18, 2015, 7:08 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/04/16/pf/college/richest-universities/.
108
Compare NACUBO, FY 2015 Endowment Market Value, supra note 107
(listing Harvard University as having nearly $36 billion in endowment assets in
2014), with Institutions Ranked by 1990 Market Value of Endowment Assets,
NAT’L ASS’N OF C. & UNIV. BUS. OFFICERS 23, http://www.nacubo.org/Research
/NACUBO-Commonfund_Study_of_Endowments/Public_NCSE_Tables/Total_
Market_Value_of_Endowments.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2017) [hereinafter
NACUBO, FY 1990 Endowment Market Value] (accessed through “1990 Total
Market Values” link) (listing Harvard University as having over $4.6 billion of
endowment assets in 1990).
109
See infra Table 4.
110
Table 4 combines statistics retrieved from the NACUBO-Commonfund
Study of Endowment Results with U.S. News and World Report university rankings, with public universities removed. See NACUBO, FY 1990 Endowment Market Value, supra note 108; NACUBO, FY 2015 Endowment Market Value, supra
note 107; National Universities Rankings, supra note 106.
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9
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University of
Chicago
Massachusetts
Institute of
Technology
Duke
University
University of
Pennsylvania
California
Institute of
Technology
Johns Hopkins
University
Dartmouth
College
Northwestern
University
Brown University
Cornell
University
Vanderbilt
University
Washington
University in
St. Louis
Rice
University
University of
Notre Dame
Emory
University
Georgetown
University
Average

735

$1,074,505,000

$7,549,710,000

$1,404,588,000

$13,474,743,000

$472,923,000

$7,296,545,000

$808,409,000

$10,133,569,000

$523,729,000

$2,198,877,000

$560,478,000

$3,412,617,000

$593,952,000

$4,663,491,000

$983,556,000

$10,193,037,000

$425,750,000

$3,073,349,000

$926,900,000

$6,037,546,000

$603,708,000

$4,133,542,000

$1,365,854,000

$6,818,748,000

$1,068,633,000

$5,557,479,000

$605,630,000

$8,566,952,000

$1,153,875,000

$6,684,305,000

$242,255,000

$1,528,869,000

$1,243,527,238

$10,377,609,000
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Whatever the increase in endowment size from 1990 to 2015
purchased, it is quite clear that it did not purchase more education.111
As shown in Table 5, during this period, the average full-time undergraduate enrollment at the top-twenty private universities increased by an anemic 22.1%, from 5,376 to 6,564 students. This increase works out to an annual compounded rate of only 0.80%.112
During this period, the average amount of endowed funds per fulltime undergraduate student at the top-twenty private universities increased from $231,311 to $1,580,989.113
Table 5114
Rank

School

1

Princeton
University
Harvard
University
Yale
University
Columbia
University
Stanford
University
University of
Chicago
Massachusetts
Institute of
Technology
Duke
University

2
3
4
4
4
7
8

1990 Full-Time
Undergraduate
Enrollment
4,497

2015 Full-Time
Undergraduate
Enrollment
5,275

6,587

6,688

5,185

5,470

3,265

6,170

6,505

7,019

3,382

5,616

4,242

4,476

5,950

6,601

111
See infra Table 5 (noting that the percentage increase in endowment size
far outpaced the increase in undergraduate enrollment increases).
112
See id.
113
Compare supra Table 4, with infra Table 5.
114
Undergraduate enrollment data was obtained from U.S. News and World
Report. See Directory of Colleges and Universities, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
2015 [hereinafter Directory 2015]; Directory of Colleges and Universities, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., 1990 [hereinafter Directory 1990].
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University of
Pennsylvania
California
Institute of
Technology
Johns Hopkins
University
Dartmouth
College
Northwestern
University
Brown
University
Cornell
University
Vanderbilt
University
Washington
University in
St. Louis
Rice
University
University of
Notre Dame
Emory
University
Georgetown
University
Average

737

9,395

9,437

796

983

3,170

6,161

3,795

4,228

7,331

8,278

5,608

6,255

12,716

14,453

5,157

6,778

4,916

6,686

2,741

3,872

7,500

8,340

4,711

7,732

5,449

7,226

5,376

6,564

While endowments have had at most a negligible impact on the
number of students being educated, it is conceivable that they have
had a greater impact either on the cost of education or on educational
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quality.115 Unfortunately, it is difficult to measure either of these potential impacts.116 To assess any impact endowments may have on
cost, we must compare the actual change in the cost of a university
education to the change that would have occurred had the universities not had their endowments. Unfortunately, this comparison presents a counterfactual, so I can only offer a conjecture.117 But I am
skeptical that endowment growth has placed any serious restraint on
the cost of a university education.118 When the ever-increasing
sticker price of these elite educations is compared to the personal
consumption expenditures index generally,119 it is hard to believe

115
See Sarah E. Waldeck, The Coming Showdown Over University Endowments: Enlisting the Donors, 77 FORDHAM L. REV 1795, 1798 (2009). See also,
e.g., Thomas M. Stauffer, Quality in American Education, in QUALITY—HIGHER
EDUCATION’S PRINCIPAL CHALLENGE 1, 2 (Thomas M. Stauffer ed., 1981)
(“Quality is someone’s subjective assessment, for there is no way of objectively
measuring what is in essence an attribute of value.” (quoting ALLAN M. CARTTER,
AN ASSESSMENT OF QUALITY IN GRADUATE EDUCATION 4 (1966)) (emphasis in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
116
See, e.g., Stauffer, supra note 115, at 2.
117
Many supporters of the current tax treatment of college and university endowments are more than willing to claim that educational endowments directly
impact educational quality, however. See, e.g., Anthony W. Marx, Defending College Endowments, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2008), http://www.latimes.com/la-oemarx12-2008oct12-story.html (“It’s a good thing that colleges have been allowed
to tend to [their] resources as needed . . . .Because . . . endowed colleges can now
use that money to continue to offer generous financial aid packages for our nation’s best, brightest and neediest students . . . .”); Myths About College and University Endowments, ASS’N AM. UNIV. 2 (Jan. 26, 2009), https://www.aau.edu
/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=7792 (“For colleges and universities with
sizable endowments, the difference [between the tuition charged by the institution
and the cost of education per individual] is subsidized by earnings from their endowments.”). But even if the subsidization argument were true, the increase in
demand for the services these colleges and universities provide caused by this
subsidization would theoretically result in an increase—rather than a decrease—
in the cost to the individual student. See Waldeck, supra note 117, at 1798.
118
See, e.g., Alexander E.M. Hess & Samuel Weigley, Universities Getting
the Most Government Money, 24/7 WALL ST. (Apr. 25, 2013, 6:43 AM),
http://247wallst.com/special-report/2013/04/25/universities-getting-the-mostgovernment-money/ (discussing how schools with substantial endowments also
receive the greatest amount of federal funding).
119
See, e.g., Janet Lorin, College Tuition in the U.S. Again Rises Faster Than
Inflation, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 13, 2014, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/
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that endowment growth can possibly have had any positive effect on
keeping education prices in check.120 As shown in Table 6, full-time
tuition at these elite universities during the relevant period increased
237.84% from an average of $14,061 to an average of $47,504,
which works out to a 4.99% annualized rate. During the same period, consumer prices increased 81%, which works out to a
2.40% annualized rate.121 In other words, notwithstanding a massive
increase in the size of endowments, tuition rose, year-in and yearout, at more than twice the rate of inflation.122
Table 6123
Rank

School

1

Princeton
University
Harvard
University
Yale
University
Columbia
University
Stanford
University

2
3
4
4

1990 Full-Time
Tuition & Fees
$15,440

2015 Full-Time
Tuition & Fees
$43,450

$14,450

$45,278

$15,180

$47,600

$14,472

$51,008

$14,280

$46,320

news/articles/2014-11-13/college-tuition-in-the-u-s-again-rises-faster-than-inflation (noting that at private and public institutions, tuition and fee expenses have
generally outpaced any increases to the consumption expenditures index).
120
Indeed, one can argue that the schools capture the benefits generated by
endowments. See, e.g., Waldeck, supra note 115, at 1817–18.
121
The percentage rate increase of consumer prices was derived by using the
Bureau of Labor Statistics’ CPI calculator to compute the amount required to buy
the same basket of goods in 2015 that could have been purchased for $1.00 in
1990. See CPI Inflation Calculator, BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF LAB.,
http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2015).
122
See also Danielle Kurtzleben, Charts: Just How Fast Has College Tuition
Grown?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Oct. 23, 2013, 3:56 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/10/23/charts-just-how-fast-has-college-tuitiongrown.
123
Tuition data were obtained from U.S. News and World Report. See Directory, 2015, supra note 114; Directory 1990, supra note 114.
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University of
Chicago
Massachusetts
Institute
of Technology
Duke
University
University of
Pennsylvania
California
Institute of
Technology
Johns Hopkins
University
Dartmouth
College
Northwestern
University
Brown
University
Cornell
University
Vanderbilt
University
Washington
University in
St. Louis
Rice
University
University of
Notre Dame
Emory
University
Georgetown
University
Average
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$14,895

$50,193

$15,600

$46,704

$13,760

$49,341

$13,450

$49,536

$13,300

$45,390

$15,000

$48,710

$15,267

$49,506

$13,725

$49,047

$15,295

$49,346

$15,164

$49,116

$13,975

$43,838

$14,800

$48,093

$6,900

$42,253

$12,390

$47,929

$13,500

$46,314

$14,440

$48,611

$14,061

$47,504
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Unfortunately, unlike quantity or cost, it is next to impossible to
measure the quality of the educations being delivered.124 One could
analyze a time series of standardized test scores for graduate and
professional schools, such as the GRE, the LSAT, the MCAT, or the
GMAT, to see how performance has changed over the last
twenty-five years.125 However, some college students (even at elite
universities) do not take these tests.126 Moreover, the makeup of
these tests and the grading of these tests has changed over time.127
124

See, e.g., Stauffer, supra note 115, at 2 (“Quality is someone’s subjective
assessment, for there is no way of objectively measuring what is in essence an
attribute of value.” (quoting ALLAN M. CARTTER, AN ASSESSMENT OF QUALITY
IN GRADUATE EDUCATION 4 (1966)) (emphasis in original) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
125
U.S. News and World Report bases their school rankings in part on these
test scores. See, e.g., Robert Morse, Eric Brooks, & Matt Mason, How U.S. News
Calculated the 2017 Best Colleges Rankings, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Sept.
12, 2016, 10:00 PM), http://www.usnews.com/education/best-colleges/articles/how-us-news-calculated-the-rankings; Brian Huddleston, USN&WR Law
School Rankings, Color-Coded Changes, 2015 to 2016 Editions, BRIAN
HUDDLESTON BLOG (Mar. 25, 2015, 12:56 PM), http://brianhuddleston.blogspot.
com/2015/03/usn-law-school-rankings-color-coded.html; Ry Rivard, Lowering
the Bar, INSIDE HIGHER EDUC. (Jan. 16, 2015), https://www.insidehighered.
com/news/2015/01/16/law-schools-compete-students-many-may-not-have-admit
ted-past (noting that the median LSAT scores of admitted law students have been
in a state of decline). But see Jack Schneider & Anil Nathan, How to Measure
School Quality, EDUC. WEEK (Oct. 29, 2013), http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles
/2013/10/30/10schneider.h33.html.
126
See Delece Smith-Barrow, As Law Schools Undergo Reform, Some Relax
LSAT Requirements, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Apr. 2, 2015, 9:00 AM),
http://www.usnews.com/education/best-graduate-schools/top-law-schools/articles/2015/04/02/as-law-schools-undergo-reform-some-relax-lsat-requirements;
Todd Johnson, BS/MD Programs That Don’t Require the MCAT, COLL.
ADMISSIONS PARTNERS (Feb. 18, 2014), http://www.collegeadmissionspartners.
com/bsmd-programs/bsmd-programs-dont-require-mcat/; Aidan Sullivan, Ten
Graduate School Programs That Don’t Require the GRE, ACCEPT U (Oct. 5,
2015) http://acceptu.com/2015/10/ten-graduate-school-programs-dont-requiregre/; Rachel Beckstead, MBA No GMAT: MBA Programs That Don’t Require the
GMAT, COLL. ATLAS (June 7, 2016), https://www.collegeatlas.org/mba-programs
-that-dont-require-gmat.
127
See, e.g., Jamie Gumbrecht, Major Changes Coming to 2016 SAT Test:
Here’s What, How and Why, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2014/03/05/living/sattest-changes-schools/ (last updated Mar. 6, 2014, 10:34 AM); Morse, Brooks, &
Mason, supra note 125 (factoring SAT and ACT scores into a school’s “selectivity score” only for those students who actually took the tests).
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Thus, comparing test results from different years would be largely
meaningless. And in any event, such comparisons would arguably
be measuring the wrong thing.128 To wit, at least one commentator
has persuasively argued that value-added is the only valid measure
of the quality of any education because value-added is the only objective market assessment of educational quality.129
While difficult, it is generally possible to determine the valueadded of a particular education.130 I opt here, however, for something simpler. I will compare the value-added from a private university education to the value-added from the closest competing product, a public university education. My data is the entry-level and
mid-career salaries earned by graduates of the top-twenty private
universities and the top-ten public universities. See Table 7. My aim
is to produce a crude measure of excess-bang-for-the-excess-buck.
That is, I will determine what kind of return private university students receive in the employment market in exchange for the additional tuition that they pay to private universities.131

128

See id.; supra note 126.
See generally Douglas C. Bennett, Assessing Quality in Higher Education,
87 LIBERAL EDUC. 40, 40–45 (2001). For other perspectives on how to measure
educational quality, see generally RICHARD ARUM & JOSIPA ROKSA,
ACADEMICALLY ADRIFT: LIMITED LEARNING ON COLLEGE CAMPUSES 59–89
(2011) (evaluating institutions by selectivity and college major relative to the required reading and writing requirements for classes at those institutions, as well
as using other criteria); Lewis C. Solomon, A Multidimensional Approach to
Quality, in QUALITY—HIGHER EDUCATION’S PRINCIPAL CHALLENGE 6–14
(Thomas M. Stauffer ed., 1981) (suggesting criteria subjective to an institution’s
and its students’ specific goals while also noting “value added” as a key consideration in developing these criteria).
130
See, e.g., Herwig Schlunk, Mamas Don’t Let Your Babies Grow Up To
Be . . . Lawyers 1–4 (Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch., Working Paper No. 09-29,
2009), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1497044 (specifically
the methodology employed to value law degrees).
131
See, e.g., Jonathan D. Glater, Weighing the Costs in Public vs. Private College, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/13/education/13voices.html (noting that for many the cost of attendance should be a consideration when selecting a university). See also Valerie Strauss, Costs of Public
vs. Private College, WASH. POST: THE ANSWER SHEET (Jan. 12, 2010, 6:30 AM),
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/answer-sheet/college-costs/comparing-costsof-public-priv.html (showing the disparity between public and private educational
institution prices).
129
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What does the data show? The excess of the tuition at a toptwenty private university over the in-state tuition at a top-ten public
university averages $33,982 per year, for an aggregate of $135,928
over the course of a four-year college education.132 In exchange for
this additional tuition, graduates of the private universities earn, on
average, an additional $6,646 in their first year of employment and
an additional $11,950 per year in the middle of their careers.133
While determining the appropriate discount rate to apply for the purpose of valuing these incremental earnings would be difficult and
controversial, even relatively modest discount rates support the argument that private university students earn, at best, a fair return on
their excess tuition expenditures.134

132

See infra Table 7.
See id.
134
For example, assume that incremental wages begin at $6,646, grow to
$11,950 after fifteen years in the workforce, and (improbably) continue to grow
at that same rate for the remainder of a forty-year career. In that case, if a discount
rate of 8% is applied, the incremental wages have a net present value of $134,200,
or slightly less than the incremental tuition that was paid to achieve them. For
reasons I have articulated elsewhere, one could argue that 8% is an indefensibly
low discount rate to apply to such incremental wages. See Schlunk, supra note
133, at 7–8.
133
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Table 7
Part A135
Rank

Private
School

1

Princeton
University
Harvard
University
Yale
University
Columbia
University
Stanford
University
University of
Chicago
Massachusetts
Institute of
Technology
Duke
University
University of
Pennsylvania
California
Institute of
Technology
Johns Hopkins
University
Dartmouth
College

2
3
4
4
4
7
8
9
10
10
12

135

2015 FullTime
Tuition
$43,450

2015
Starting
Median
Salary
$61,300

MidCareer
Median
Salary
$122,000

$45,278

$61,400

$126,000

$47,600

$60,300

$104,000

$51,008

$60,200

$104,000

$46,320

$65,900

$123,000

$50,193

$50,600

$107,000

$46,704

$74,900

$124,000

$49,341

$60,600

$111,000

$49,536

$60,300

$120,000

$45,390

$72,600

$125,000

$48,710

$57,500

$97,500

$49,506

$56,300

$111,000

For tuition data, see National University Rankings, supra note 106 (data
accessed through each school’s individual profile). For salary data, see 2015-2016
PayScale College Salary Report, PAYSCALE, https://web.archive.org/web/20160
313085131/http://www.payscale.com/college-salary-report/bachelors (data retrieved from March 13, 2016 archived site because website figures were updated
to reflect the 2016-2017 academic year).
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Northwestern
University
Brown
University
Cornell
University
Vanderbilt
University
Washington
University in
St. Louis
Rice
University
University of
Notre Dame
Emory
University
Georgetown
University

$49,047

$56,300

$102,000

$49,346

$57,100

$108,000

$49,116

$59,700

$109,000

$43,838

$57,300

$102,000

$48,093

$55,500

$105,000

$42,253

$63,900

$114,000

$47,929

$57,400

$106,000

$46,314

$51,300

$89,800

$48,611

$51,800

$110,000

Average

$47,504

$59,629

$110,490

2015-16
In-State
Tuition &
Fees
$13,432

2015-16
Starting
Median
Salary
$59,500

MidCareer
Median
Salary
$114,000

$12,753

$51,800

$96,900

$14,526

$54,700

$97,600

Table 7
Part B

Rank

Public School

1

University of
California,
Berkeley
University of
California,
Los Angeles
University of
Virginia

2
3
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4
5

University of
Michigan at
Ann Arbor
University of
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$14,336

$58,000

$96,000

$8,562

$46,200

$79,400

$16,919

$45,900

$92,500

$12,204

$62,500

$112,000

$13,865

$49,400

$96,300

$14,577

$49,900

$97,700

$14,042

$52,400

$103,000

$13,522

$53,030

$98,540

North Carolina

6
7
8
9
9

at Chapel Hill
College of
William
and Mary
Georgia
Institute of
Technology
University of
California at
Santa Barbara
University of
California at
Irvine
University of
California at
San Diego
Average

This result is hardly surprising. Giving private university educations the benefit of the doubt by treating the return earned on excess
tuition payments as a full, fair market return, the result says nothing
more than that, from the perspective of buyers (that is, the students
or their parents), the market for a college education appears to be
efficient. Private university students get what their tuition dollars
pay for, no less and no more. But this observation in turn casts a
troubling shadow over the grant of tax preferences to private university endowments.
I take it as an article of faith that the only legitimate beneficiaries
of private university endowments are university students.136 That is,
136

See supra Introduction, at 3. Cf. Paul G. Haskell, The University as Trustee,
17 GA. L. REV. 1, 5 (1982) (“[T]he university is indeed a model of fiduciary responsibility to students and the community at large. As a fiduciary it should be
accountable to those it serves . . . .”).
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the federal government has a public goal of having an educated populace.137 When the government provides education directly, that is
through the states, it takes value in the form of taxes from those who
are, on balance, already better educated (i.e., workers and investors)
and transfers such value in the form of a public university education
to those who are on balance less educated (i.e., students).138 Alternatively, when the government provides education indirectly by
granting tax benefits to private donors, it allows some of those who
are, on balance, already better educated (i.e., donors) to take value
in the form of net contributions to private universities and the accompanying federal tax expenditures and effectively transfer such
value in the form of a private university education to those who are,
on balance, less educated (i.e., students).139 In other words, the purpose of diverting what would otherwise be public funds to private
university endowments is to educate—and consequently transfer
value to—private university students.140
If such a transfer is indeed occurring, then I should find, given
the massive increase in the amount of would-be public funds that
have been diverted to private university endowments during the past
two-and-a-half decades,141 that private university students earn a
significant extraordinary return on their excess tuition dollars.142
This extraordinary return would represent the amount of value transferred by the endowments to the students. In addition, I should find
that such extraordinary return was increasing over time, reflecting
the increase in the size of the endowments.143 In light of these expected findings, the result of a merely fair return on excess tuition
dollars is disappointing.
If private university endowments are not financing extraordinary
returns for private university students, relative to the returns those
137

But see Colombo, supra note 73, at 844–45 (arguing that while the legislative history behind the tax exemption of educational institutions is nonexistent,
the exemption has its origins in the former ministerial purposes of those institutions).
138
See supra Part II.
139
See id.
140
Cf. Hansmann, Why Are Colleges and Universities Exempt from Taxes?,
supra note 18 (minus 117), at 4.
141
See supra Table 4.
142
See supra Table 7.
143
Compare supra Table 4, with supra Table 7.
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students would achieve by instead investing in public university educations, they must be financing something else. There are two possibilities. The first possibility is that private university endowments
may be financing transfers of value to students that precisely offset
any transfers of value such students would receive if such students
instead attended public universities. This would be quite a coincidence. Among its requirements is that public university students
must in fact be receiving transfers of value. They may be: a public
university education may be more valuable than the tuition spent to
purchase it. Suppose that it is. If excess tuition spent on a private
university education produces exactly a fair return, it follows that a
private university education is also more valuable than the tuition
spent to purchase it, indeed by exactly the same amount as a public
university education. If there is such a transfer of value in the case
of a private university education, it must be funded somehow—private university endowments are the most likely source of such funding.144
There is a second possibility. Private university endowments
may be financing expenditures that provide little or no benefit to
students at all. For example, private universities may be using their
endowments to finance ever-larger faculties with ever-lighter teaching loads.145 Or, they may be inefficiently throwing additional dollars at items such as enhanced physical plant, higher faculty salaries,
and increased overhead, including larger administrative staffs and
higher administrative salaries.146
144
Cf. JORGE KLOR DE ALVA & MARK SCHNEIDER, NEXUS RES. & POL’Y
CTR., Rich Schools, Poor Students: Tapping Large University Endowments to Improve Student Outcomes 4–9 & tbl. 1 (Apr. 2015), available at http://nexusresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Rich_Schools_Poor_Students.pdf
(the amount of tax subsidies for private universities with high endowments is substantially greater than that for public universities).
145
See, e.g., Andrew J. Rotherham, College Endowments: Why Even Harvard
Isn’t as Rich as You Think, TIME (Feb. 9, 2012), http://ideas.time.com/2012/
02/09/college-endowments-why-even-harvard-isnt-as-rich-as-you-think/ (“When
your alma mater calls you and asks for a donation, it’s really hoping you’ll give
to its general fund, where the use of your donation is unrestricted. Donations
[given] for scholarships or specific degrees, programs or activities can be used
only for those purposes.”).
146
See, e.g., Douglas Belkin & Scott Thurm, Deans List: Hiring Spree Fattens
College Bureaucracy—And Tuition, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 28, 2012, 10:30 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014241278873233168045781614907160428
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The available data on faculty size are, unfortunately, nearly impossible to parse. U.S. News and World Report changed its reporting during the period beginning in 1990, initially reporting “faculty
size” as a number but subsequently switching to crude student-faculty ratios. Moreover, is it unclear what persons are included in either measure of faculty. Are a medical school’s clinical faculty included? What about adjunct professors, graduate students, teaching
assistants, and so forth? Sadly, the dearth of clarity means that any
statement on my part about the impact of endowment size on faculty
size would be nothing more than speculation. Maybe there has been
such an impact. Maybe not. And I similarly cannot say anything
definitive about the impact of endowment size on physical plant,
faculty salaries, or administrative staff size (although I confess to
having strong suspicions that each of these has indeed been positively impacted).
But I can say something definitive about administrative remuneration: it has almost certainly been a beneficiary of increased endowment size, at least if chief executive compensation is any
guide.147 Such compensation at the top-twenty private universities
increased 680.83% from 1990 to 2013, from an average of $213,704
to an average of $1,668,667.148 This works out to an annualized rate
of 9.35%, or nearly four times the rate of inflation, year-in and yearout.149

14; Paul F. Campos, The Real Reason College Costs So Much, N.Y. TIMES, (Apr.
4, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/05/opinion/sunday/the-real-reasoncollege-tuition-costs-so-much.html. But see Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, College
Tuition is Getting More Expensive. Here’s Who’s Actually to Blame., WASH. POST
(Apr. 7, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2015/04/07
/college-tuition-is-getting-more-expensive-heres-whos-actually-to-blame/ (arguing that the rise in the “professional staff” may be outweighing the size—and
cost—of the administrative staff).
147
See infra Table 8.
148
See infra Table 8. This applies to those twenty schools other than
Georgetown, for which data was either available in both years or was available
for at least relatively contemporaneous years. See id.
149
Compare infra Table 8, with CPI Inflation Calculator, supra note 124 (annualized inflation rate is 2.4%).
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Table 8150
Rank

School

1990 CEO
Compensation

1

Princeton
University

$188,917

2

Harvard
University

$148,383

$929,584

3

Yale
University

$187,500

$771,987 +
$1,119,974 =
$1,891,961

$297,000

$4,615,230

$194,375

$963,248

$222,500

$1,337,869

$226,000

$878,324

$214,456

$1,159,855

$250,000

$3,065,746

$200,000

$640,295 +
454,887 =
$1,095,182

4
4
4
7
8
9
10

150

Columbia
University
Stanford
University
University of
Chicago
Massachusetts
Institute of
Technology
Duke
University
University of
Pennsylvania
California
Institute of
Technology

2013 CEO
Compensation
$730,631 +
$931,327 =
$1,661,958

Data on chief executive compensation was obtained from: Brian O’Leary &
Joshua Hatch, Executive Compensation at Private and Public Colleges, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC. (Dec. 4, 2016), http://chronicle.com/interactives/executive-compensation#id=table_private_2013 (phrase searched is as follows: “In 2013, which
private-college leaders earned the highest total compensation in the U.S.?”). I limited the comparison of chief executive compensation to the 15 chief executives at
those private universities for which I was able to find compensation information
for both years. See id. The figures included in Table 8 denote each executive’s
total compensation for 2013 as calculated by The Chronicle of Higher Education,
including base pay, bonus pay, nontaxable compensation, other compensation,
and deferred compensation set aside.
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10

Johns Hopkins
University

$225,649

12

Dartmouth
College

$309,764
(1992-1993)

12
14
15
15
15
18
18
20
20

Northwestern
University
Brown
University
Cornell
University
Vanderbilt
University
Washington
University in
St. Louis

$1,629,325+
$3,821,566 =
$5,450,891
$669,618 +
$580,552 =
$1,250,170

$198,500

$1,211,285

$223,588
(1991-1992)

$739,681

$112,690

$907,191

$300,000

$2,147,452

$105,000

$1,004,194

University of
Notre Dame
Emory
University
Georgetown
University

$210,959
(1990-1991)
$196,396
(1991-1992)
$262,384
(1991-1992)
$345,529
(1998)

Average

$213,704

Rice University

751

$1,067,362
$956,393
$1,039,772
$851,304
$1,668,667

My objective in this analysis is not to criticize private university
chief executive compensation. Nonetheless, I want to make two
points about such compensation. First, the mere fact that such compensation may be lower than the compensation of many chief executives in the private sector does not mean that it is not excessive.151
151

See Jaeah Lee & Maggie Severns, Charts: When College Presidents Are
Paid Like CEOs, MOTHER JONES (Sept. 5, 2013, 5:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/09/charts-college-presidents-overpaid-pay (comparing
college and university faculty and executive pay). See generally Brian Galle &
David I. Walker, Nonprofit Executive Pay as an Agency Problem: Evidence from
U.S. Colleges and Universities, 94 B.U.L. REV. 1881, 1895–1904 (2014) (arguing
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Private sector compensation only provides a relevant comparison for
private university chief executives with the ability and the desire to
relocate to the private sector.152 Given that such relocations are extremely rare, it seems implausible that very many private university
chief executives have that ability or desire. Second, and far more
importantly, the fact that private university chief executive compensation is determined by competition between various universities
does not mean that it is not, in an important sense, excessive.153 A
numerical example will illustrate why.
Suppose that Bob is a potential university chief executive who
would command a salary of $500,000 in the private sector and who
places a value of $200,000 plus a penny on being in academia. So
long as a university offers Bob $300,000 of compensation, Bob will
become or remain an academic. This is true regardless of Bob’s actual value to academia. Nonetheless, for purposes of this illustration,
assume that Bob’s value as a university administrator, excluding his
value as a raiser of endowed funds, is exactly $300,000. In that case,
in a world without endowments, any university should be willing to
pay Bob $300,000 of compensation, and Bob should happily accept
such amount.
Now suppose that Bob has the additional skill of being a relatively efficient raiser of endowed funds. Indeed, suppose he is capa-

that constraints on nonprofit manager pay may be even weaker than such constraints in the for-profit sector).
152
See Lee & Severns, supra note 151 (“Where the networks of corporate directors and trustees are dense and overlapping, as CEO compensation in the corporate sector increases, a similar logic may well be applied to CEO compensation
in private universities.”). But see Galle & Walker, supra note 151, at 1894 (“Of
course, nonprofit executives must be paid a competitive wage. The difficulty lies
in distinguishing between competitive compensation, which is allowed, and ‘excess benefit transactions’ that represent forbidden private inurement.”).
153
Sam Sanders, America’s Highest-Paid Private-University President Made
$7.1 Million In 2012, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Dec. 8, 2014, 5:43 PM), http://
www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2014/12/08/369400033/americas-highest-paidprivate-university-president-made-7-1-million-in-2012 (“[L]egitimate questions
can be raised about at what point does compensation press the bounds of appropriateness, given the types of institutions [college presidents] lead, and the exemptions they’re afforded under the federal tax code[.]”) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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ble of raising incremental endowed funds that in turn allow the university to increase its annual spending by $50,000.154 Bob’s university would like to reap the benefit of this windfall. But so would
every other university. Thus, when the dust settles, some university
will likely offer Bob compensation of just under $350,000; Bob’s
raise reflects his incremental fund-raising prowess. But, note that
this means that Bob, rather than his university, reaps the entire value
of the incremental funds flowing into the endowment.155
This argument extends far beyond the office of chief executive.
For example, the presence of certain faculty members at a university
may lead to enhanced endowment fundraising.156 The presence of
larger administrative staffs may lead to enhanced endowment fundraising.157 The presence of a nicer football stadium may lead to enhanced endowment fundraising.158 In the first case, the relevant faculty members will, in the limit, enjoy increases in their compensation that completely swallow up their “contribution” to the endowment.159 In the second case, the administrative staff will, in the limit,
see an increase in its budget that completely swallows up its “contribution” to the endowment.160 And in the third case, the nicer football stadium will be built so long as the cost is at least one penny
less than the amount it “adds” to the endowment.161
154

For example, based solely on his charisma, Bob might be able to raise $1
million more of endowed funds than would the typical university president. In
that case, if Bob’s university endowment has a 5% payout rate, Bob would provide
the university with approximately an additional $50,000 per year to spend.
155
Given that money is fungible, this will be true no matter how the endowed
funds are restricted.
156
See, e.g., New Professorship Honors Longtime Pharmaceutical Researcher, KU NEWS (Apr. 13, 2015), http://news.ku.edu/2015/04/13/new-professorship-honors-longtime-pharmaceutical-researcher.
157
See, e.g., Emily Lane, LSU Tables Plan to Create Vice President to Oversee Fundraising Orgs, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE (Mar. 19, 2015, 6:50 PM), http://
www.nola.com/news/baton-rouge/index.ssf/2015/03/lsu_foundation_moret_sear
ch.html.
158
See, e.g., Riley Blevins, Ole Miss AD Ross Bjork Agrees to 4-Year Extension, THE CLARION-LEDGER (Apr. 17, 2015, 11:19 AM), http://www.clarionledger.com/story/olemisssports/2015/04/17/ole-miss-ad-ross-bjork-agrees-to-4year-extension/25934979/.
159
See, e.g., KU NEWS, supra note 156.
160
See, e.g., Lane, supra note 157.
161
See, e.g., id.
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I am enough of a capitalist that I generally have no particular
objection to the earning of economic rents.162 But these are artificially created rents: from a societal perspective, they are nothing
more than excessive payments.163 In each and every case, the payment is financed by a diversion of what should have been federal tax
revenue.164 That is, scarce money that would otherwise have been
available to the federal government to pursue public goals will instead find its way into a private university endowment, where it will
effectively be earmarked to pay a perpetual rent to someone (or
something) at the university.165 Importantly, none of the diverted tax
revenue will provide any educational benefit to the university’s students.166 Thus, as shown in Table 2.6 (which modifies prior Table
2.4), it is possible that a tax deductible contribution to a private university endowment will lead not only to a lower level of aggregate
spending on public goals, but to no actual spending on higher education!

Table 2.6
(Potential Cash
Contribution)
Current Non-Education
Spending Controlled by
Federal Government
Current Education Spending
Controlled by Federal
Government

162

Grant of
Federal
Revenue to
State to Fund
Education

Deduction for
Contributions
used to Fund
Education

$27 million

$27 million

$3 million

$0

See generally Robert H. Wessel, A Note on Economic Rent, 57 AM. ECON.
REV. 1221, 1222 (1967) (defining “economic rent” and the “Paretian rent” concept).
163
See generally Anne O. Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking
Society, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 291, 291–303 (1974); Kevin M. Murphy, Andrei
Shleifer, & Robert W. Vishny, Why Is Rent-Seeking So Costly to Growth?, 83
AM. ECON. REV. 409, 409–14 (1993).
164
See supra Part III.
165
See id.
166
See supra Part III–IV.
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$7 million

$0

$0

$7.143 million

So, which is it? Do private university endowments finance transfers to students that precisely offset any transfers such students
would receive if such students instead attended public universities?
Or do they merely finance rents unrelated to the quality of education? I tend to think they do some of both, but that the mix has
changed dramatically over time. Thus, if one goes back far enough
in time, to the halcyon days when university administrators devoted
themselves to the educational mission rather than to fundraising, endowment dollars almost surely primarily funded the educational
mission.167 But then private university administration evolved to
where it became largely synonymous with fundraising.168 In that
world, which is the current world, newly-raised endowed funds will
almost surely fund anything and everything except the educational
mission.169
167

See, e.g., Benjamin Ginsburg, Administrators Ate My Tuition, WASH.
MONTHLY (Sept./Oct. 2011), http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/sept
emberoctober_2011/features/administrators_ate_my_tuition031641.php?page=
all (describing the change in university administrators’ view of their role, shifting
from a view “that the purpose of a university [is] the promotion of education and
research” to a “view [that] management [is] an end in and of itself.”).
168
See, e.g., id.; Jon Marcus, New Analysis Shows Problematic Boom in
Higher Ed Administrators, THE NEW ENG. CTR. FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING
(Feb. 6, 2014), http://necir.org/2014/02/06/new-analysis-shows-problematicboom-in-higher-ed-administrators/.
169
A number of scholars have recently written on the subject of the possibility
of reforming the taxation of private university endowments. See generally, e.g.,
Waldeck, supra note 115. Waldeck focuses on what she terms “excessively large”
endowments, measured on the basis of endowment per full-time student, and
seeks primarily to spur such excessively large endowments to stem the rise in
tuition. See id. at 1799, 1801–03. While she makes no serious proposals as to the
treatment of endowments that are currently excessive, she does offer very creative
proposals that would help prevent endowments from becoming more excessive in
the future. See generally id. at 1812–22. To wit, she would limit the tax deduction
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V. CONCLUSION
I have demonstrated that financing higher education in part by
means of tax deductible donations to educational endowments is unsound from a theoretical standpoint: the tax preference not only allows private donors to control the disposition of funds that the federal government would otherwise control, but also actually reduces
the aggregate amount of funds available to satisfy all public goals.170
No appreciable public benefits are obtained in exchange for the loss
of control—much flexibility is sacrificed.171 And obviously, no public benefit can accrue from reducing the funds available to satisfy
public goals. Finally, when the would-be public funds are diverted
to private endowments, those funds will, to a great extent, cease to
be used to satisfy any public goal at all.172 Rather, they will be further diverted to the pockets of individuals who are adept at attracting
such funds.173
I have also demonstrated that real world evidence174 seems to
supports the theory. The evidence suggests that increased size of private university endowments has not led to more higher education, to
cheaper higher education, or to better higher education.175 On the
other hand, the evidence does suggest that the increased size of private university endowments has led to higher levels of remuneration
for private university chief executive officers.176
In the best of all possible worlds, the federal government could
and probably should respond to these observations with some dramatic action such as the confiscation of all private university endow-

in the case of gifts that are targeted at the purchase or construction of depreciable
assets (such assets do not necessarily improve the quantity or quality of education,
but almost always add to its cost). See id. at 1818–19. In addition, she would deny
a deduction for any gift that does not specify that it must be spent within twentyfive years. See id. at 1819. For the other side of the coin, Cowan argues in favor
of the status quo for no better reason than that it is, well, the status quo. Cf. Cowan,
supra note 31, at 551–52.
170
See supra Part III.
171
See id..
172
See supra Part IV.
173
See id.
174
See id.
175
See id.
176
See id.

2017]

CHARITABLE DEDUCTION

757

ments: after all, such endowments contain nothing more than diverted federal tax revenue.177 But, our Constitution would likely
prohibit such action.178 And in any event, my focus here has been
not so much on the existence of endowments, but rather on their
ability to grow by means of attracting new gifts that are tax deductible to the donors.
Thus, my policy prescription is that the federal government
should, at a minimum, repeal the I.R.C. § 170 deduction for any gift
that prohibits the donee institution from immediately spending such
gift.179 Given the vagaries of budgeting, an institution cannot, realistically speaking, immediately spend every gift, at least not in a
manner that would benefit students and the public at large. But nothing should prevent the institution from doing so, provided that
within such institution’s judgment, its mission would best be served
by such immediate deployment.180 In any event, this change to the
I.R.C. § 170 deduction would encourage donors to replace problematic larger one-time gifts with smaller much less problematic annual
gifts. And that would represent a win for higher education.

177

See supra Part III.
See U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 5 (“[N]or shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.”); JOHN BOURDEAU ET AL., 26 AM. JUR. 2D
EMINENT DOMAIN § 6 (Westlaw 2017).
179
Federal income tax law does feature some, albeit very limited, restrictions
on deductions for donor-restricted gifts. See generally Alan F. Rothschild, Jr.,
How Donors May—And May Not—Exercise Control of Charitable Gifts, 16
TAX’N OF EXEMPTS 110, 110–15 (2004).
180
As an aside, state law does currently permit the release or modification of
donor restrictions on endowment funds under certain limited circumstances. See
generally Susan N. Gary, Charities, Endowments, and Donor Intent: The Uniform
Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act, 41 GA. L. REV. 1277, 1279–1332
(2007).
178

